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"Imagination is more important than knowledge. 
For while knowledge defines all we currently know and understand,  
imagination points to all we might yet discover and create” 
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ABSTRACT 
Penetration Tests (Pentests) identify potential vulnerabilities in the security of computer 
systems via security assessment. However, it should also benefit from widely recognized 
methodologies and recommendations within this field, as the Penetration Testing Execution 
Standard (PTES). The objective of this research is to explore PTES, particularly the three initial 
phases: 1. Pre-Engagement Interactions; 2. Intelligence Gathering; 3. Threat Modeling; and 
ultimately to apply Intelligence techniques to the Threat Modeling phase. To achieve this, we 
will use open-source and/or commercial tools to structure a process to clarify how the results 
were reached using the research inductive methodology. The following steps were 
implemented: i) critical review of the “Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES)”; ii) 
critical review of Intelligence Production Process; iii) specification and classification of 
contexts in which Intelligence could be applied; iv) definition of a methodology to apply 
Intelligence Techniques to the specified contexts; v) application and evaluation of the proposed 
methodology to real case study as proof of concept. This research has the ambition to develop 
a model grounded on Intelligence techniques to be applied on PTES Threat Modeling phase. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Intelligence; Pentesting; PTES; Structured Analytic Techniques; Threat Modeling.
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GLOSSARY 
Part I – List of Abbreviations and Acronyms   
BEI – Biometrics-enabled Intelligence 
CCA – Cross-Consistency Assessment 
CCM – Cross-Consistency Matrix 
CI – Counterintelligence 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
DOMEX – Document and Media Exploitation 
FEI – Forensics-enabled Intelligence 
GMA – General Morphological Analysis 
GMI – General Military Intelligence  
HUMINT – Human Intelligence 
HVAC – Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
I2 – Identity Intelligence  
IMINT – Imagery Intelligence  
ISHD – Islamic State Hacking Division 
ISSAF – Information Systems Security Assessment Framework 
MASINT – Measurements and Signatures Intelligence 
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OIR – Other Information Requirements 
OSINT – Open Source Intelligence 
OWASP – Open Web Application Security Project 
PeI – Pre-engagement Interactions 
PENTEST – Penetration Test 
PENTESTER– Penetration Tester 
PIR – Priority Intelligence Requirement 
PTES – Penetration Testing Execution Standard  
S&TI – Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
SAT – Structured Analytical Techniques 
SE – Social Engineering 
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence  
SIRP – Information Services of Portuguese Republic 
SMB – Small and Medium-sized Businesses 
SOCMINT – Social Media Intelligence 
TECNHOINT – Technological Collection 
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Part II – Terms and Definitions    
Active Intelligence Gathering – This type of intelligence gathering should be detected by the 
target and identified as suspicious or malicious behaviors. Information about network 
infrastructure, open ports other vulnerabilities should be identified. 
Blind test – On this type of security testing the Pentester has no prior knowledge of the testing 
subject. However, the target is prepared for Pentesting, knowing in advance all its details. This 
scenario measures the performance and skills of the Pentester. Also known as War Gaming 
or Role Playing. 
Collection Plan – Systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection 
capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy 
specific information requirements. 
Cross Consistency Assessment – Process by which the attributes values in the morphological 
field are compared with one another, pair-wise, into a cross-impact matrix (CCM). As each 
pair of values is examined, a judgement is made to understand if the pair can coexist, 
representing a consistent relationship.  
Cyber knowledge – The proficiency related to computers, information networks, or automated 
systems. 
Double Blind test – On this type of security testing the Pentester has no prior knowledge of 
the testing subject. Also, the target is not notified in advance about the scope, channels and 
vectors to be tested. This scenario tests both teams’ skills and preparedness to unknown 
variables. Also known as Black-box test or Penetration test. 
Double Gray Box test – On this type of security testing the Pentester has limited knowledge 
about its defenses and assets and full knowledge about channels. The target is notified in 
advance about the scope and audit time frame. However, the channels that will be tested or the 
test vectors are not given to the target. This scenario tests both skills and preparedness of the 
Pentester and the target. Also known as White Box Test. 
Gray Box test – On this type of security testing the Pentester has limited knowledge of its 
defenses and assets and full knowledge of channels. This test is often performed by the target 
itself to get a self-assessment of the internal system. The target is prepared for Pentesting, 
knowing in advance all its details. This scenario measures the skills and knowledge of the 
Pentester to unknown variables. Also known as Vulnerability Test. 
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Human Intelligence – A category of Intelligence derived from information collected and 
provided by human sources. Also known as HUMINT.  
Imagery Intelligence – A category of Intelligence derived from the collection of images from 
a variety of platforms. Also called IMINT. Comprising either individually or in combination 
the Photo Intelligence (PHOTINT) and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). 
Kinetic knowledge – The proficiency related to physical systems, motion of bodies, and forces 
associated with that movement. 
Measurement and Signature Intelligence – A category of Intelligence derived from analysis 
and treatment of data and information (quantitative and qualitative) obtained through sensors. 
Associated to the transmitters or receivers through the measurement of specific parameters. 
Also known as MASINT. Comprising either individually or in combination frequency sensors 
of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as radio, nuclear, acoustic, seismic and optical 
frequencies. 
Morphological Field – The field of constructed dimensions or attributes which is the basis for 
a morphological model.  
Morphological Model – A morphological field with its attributes assessed and linked through 
a Cross-Consistency Assessment (CCA).  
Open Source Intelligence – A category of Intelligence which involves gathering and acquiring 
information from open sources and then using it to reform legal intelligence. Also Called 
OSINT. 
Passive Intelligence Gathering – It is used when the target is required not to detect the 
information gathering. In this situation, one should not interact with the target. Therefore, the 
information gathering should concentrate on archived or stored information. However, non-
updated information represents a limitation. 
Reversal test – On this type of security testing the target has full knowledge of its processes 
and operational security, but has no information about what, how, or when the Pentester will 
be testing. This scenario tests the preparedness of the target to unknown variables and vectors 
of agitation. Also known as Red Team exercise.  
Semi-Passive Intelligence Gathering – The interaction with the target must avoid detection 
in the alarm sensors. It should not appear as unusual Internet traffic and behavior. Depth reverse 
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lookups or brute force attacks should not be performed. The aim is to look for document 
metadata or published files, without drawing attention to the performed activities. 
Signals Intelligence – A category of Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, 
and foreign instrumentation signals. Also known as SIGINT. Comprising either individually 
or in combination all the Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence 
(ELINT), and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). 
Social Media Intelligence – A category of Intelligence built upon tools and solutions for social 
media monitoring. Also known as SOCMINT. Signal and Data inputs in social networks are 
processed into meaningful actionable intelligence. 
Tandem test – On this type of security testing both Pentester and target are prepared and know 
in advance all Pentesting details. This test aims to assess how strong are the protection and 
controls of the target. However, it cannot test the preparedness of the target to unknown 
variables. This is also known as Crystal Box Test.
  iPentest 
  
  1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades great technological advances have changed societies. Almost every 
person adopted these technologies, leading to undergoing structural changes. The development 
of Internet and technology in a comprehensive way, brought great opportunities. For instance, 
brought the possibility to have all kind of information at a click of distance and to connect 
people from another side of the globe, crossing over all existing geographical and temporal 
limitations. Yet, it also brought new challenges, leading organizations to re-evaluate their 
structure, processes and their own internal culture. The pace of technological advancement is 
growing fast, and consequently the volume and velocity of data is growing exponentially, 
leading to a society with a permanent need of information (Braga, 2000).  
Across the business sector, an understanding about how to get the most value from data is being 
asked. Data and information can be used to obtain actionable customer perceptions that helps 
drive new incomes and most important to strengthen the cybersecurity of its systems. Data and 
Information are a vital resource and an influence to reach superiority in every context. Acquire 
quality, reliable, timely and actionable information (information that adds value) makes 
possible to challenge preconceive limits. And it also makes possible for businesses, to develop 
a greater robustness to critical decision-making, such as decisions over its security, and 
potential existing risks to its assets (Goldman, 2006).  
Yet, the majority of businesses are not prepared to use the available data and information to 
protect them against cyber threats. Data is the new oil, information is the new gold and 
Cybercriminals will seek for it. It has become easier to be behind a computer with the amount 
of available options to become anonymous in the cyberspace. Also, the accessibility to cyber 
weapons, that makes possible for a single person to attack any business from another side of 
the globe, led criminals to invest improving of their cybernetic skills. 
The biggest concern of this research is to find ways to contribute to prevent Internal and 
External threats to access business systems. Threats are becoming more sophisticated and 
frequent. Therefore, it would be important for organizations to have mechanisms protecting 
them from threats. 
There is a lot of security information being gathered and disseminated about security events, 
and also about computer and network systems characteristics. This information should be used 
to assess the security maturity level and to implement the right mechanisms to protect 
organization’s critical assets.  
iPentest  
  
 2 
The great yearning of getting new trends, such as trendy software’s that generate financial 
profits, leads CEO’s to view the security issues as a secondary concern. Every existing gap 
in security may be exploited by cybercriminals. Therefore, security should be the first 
concern in every business and organizations. So, we should shift perspective and start now 
being concerned about the security.  
Soon, business environment will be almost unrecognizable. Everything that can be 
connected will be in short-time, which will bring great efficiency to business processes. If 
we add artificial intelligence (AI) based in software and services, then business efficiency 
will be enormous. But without a strong security maturity level, businesses may suffer chaotic 
damages, and our biggest concern is to understand what can be done to protect businesses 
from external threats and internal threats. 
Because Portuguese business community consist in small and medium-sized (SMB), 
companies will not be able to invest in high-technology to protect their critical assets. 
However, these assets are critical for any business sustainability and for this reason this 
research concern was to find an approach to modeling cybernetic and non-cybernetic threats. 
One approach SMB should take to protect their assets and assess its security maturity level 
is to use recognized Pentesting recommendations such as PTES. To clarify about business’s 
risk propensity and enabling the Pentester to closely emulate security incidents, PTES 
recommends the construction of a threat modeling model using the existing internal and 
external data and information (Nickerson et al., n.d.). 
From the exposed reality, we suggest to carry out this research, focusing on mechanisms 
to create a Threat Profiling and project potential Threat Scenarios using the existing Data 
and Information. The result of this research, iModeling, is a threat modeling model, with the 
three following functions: (1) Scenario-based Forecasting; (2) Business risk Assessment; 
and (3) Offensive Scenario-based approach; which will be explained in detail further in this 
research. 
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1.1. Research Methodology 
Based on the “fundamental principles of the scientific process” (Quivy & Campenhoudt, 
2005), in the development of this project development of this project and to investigate its 
problematic question, we adopted the inductive approach, also known as inductive 
reasoning. It can be understood as a mental process, based on particular and verified data, 
where a general or universal truth is deduced. Therefore, the purpose of inductive arguments 
is to lead to conclusions which content is much wider than the premises on which they were 
founded (Lakatos & Marconi, 2003). 
Important to the current research, inductive approaches do not imply the formulation of 
theories or hypotheses on the beginning of the research and researchers are free to alter the 
direction of the study after the research process begins (Saunders, et al, 2012). 
During the present research we used mixed research methods, such as documental analysis 
and expert interview.  
1.2. Research Objectives 
This research, which results in a Master’s dissertation in the field of "Information Warfare 
and Competitive Intelligence", aims to qualitatively contribute to this field by articulating 
and integrating knowledge learned throughout the curricular part of the master's degree. 
Additionally, in order to effectively and practically apply the obtained results on the real 
world, this research has the quantitative objective of developing a methodology for applying 
in PTES threat modeling phase. 
There are, however, intermediate objectives that together will enable the qualitative and 
quantitative objectives to be achieved: i) critical review of the “Penetration Testing 
Execution Standard” (PTES); ii) critical review of Intelligence Production Process; iii) 
specification and classification of the contexts in which Intelligence is applied; iv) definition 
of a methodology to apply Intelligence Techniques on the specified contexts; v) application 
of the proposal methodology to a real case study as proof of concept. 
1.3. Research Motivations and Relevance 
This research founded its motivations in our personal academic experience in Pentesting, 
and professional experience in Criminal Intelligence, in particularly Digital Forensic 
Intelligence Investigation. With the growth of cyber-attacks in the past years, it is more 
important than ever to undertake systematic Penetration Tests on identifying weaknesses 
  iPentest 
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before attackers. Pentesting should benefit from recognized methodologies and frameworks 
to keep the process consistent and repeatable, such as the Penetration Testing Execution 
Standard (PTES). The PTES recommendation does not benefit from a specific model to 
execute the Threat Modeling phase, although it requires the construction of a consistent 
model in specific terms with the ability to be replicable on future tests (Nickerson et al., 
n.d.). Pointing this as a gap on PTES literature, we considered it a pertinent topic for which 
we propose the development of a model, based on Intelligence techniques, to apply to the 
PTES Threat Modeling phase. The proposed model aims to assess potential risks and threats 
according to the organizations’ critical assets, supporting Pentesters to discover an efficient 
way to attack its target. 
The result of this research – a threat modeling model – could be applied by Pentesters not 
only in the scope of traditional computer systems, but also by Cyber Intelligence 
Investigators and professionals of other fields of application related to security and disaster 
recovery from several branches of the business sector. 
1.4. Statement of the Problem 
The main question (CQ) we pretend to explore is the following: Could the Intelligence 
process be systematized, identifying methodologies, techniques, and tools to build a 
model for the PTES recommendation Threat’s Modeling phase? 
To divide the central question into specific questions, we propose the following three 
research sub questions (SQ): 
- SQ1 – Could it be possible to identify common features of application between 
Intelligence process and other domains? 
- SQ2 – Could it be possible to identify methodologies, techniques, and tools that 
better adapt to specific Intelligence needs? 
- SQ3 – Could it be possible to apply Intelligence methodologies and techniques 
to build a Threat Modeling model? 
1.5. Research Limitations and Difficulties 
During this research, some limitations were found, mainly regarding the scarce of scientific 
approaches about Intelligence. The lack of available data led to significant obstacles on 
finding recent academic publications. This occurs because Intelligence is closely related to 
undercover activities, and mostly spoken by people related to secret agencies. Only after the 
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failure of September 11 Intelligence started to arise online. Also, it was by that time that 
official military documents started to be released, becoming available to public in general, 
and thus contributing to the academic field. For these reasons, it was difficult to find recent 
academic publications relating Intelligence to other fields of application, such as computer 
security. On the contrary, it was possible to find several theoretical and technical references 
in the scientific field of Penetration tests. However, academic references, particularly 
concerning PETS recommendation, revealed to be a tough task to accomplish.  Most of the 
references about PTES directs to PTES official website, a “Wiki” designed by a group of 
information security practitioners and experts from all areas of the industry around the globe.  
Taken together, the lack of academic publications, and even the variety of sources of 
information for both concepts characterize this research as having lack of prior research 
studies correlating Intelligence and Pentesting. For this reason, it was challenging to find a 
logical and coherent way to merge harmoniously Intelligence techniques with PTES 
recommendation while having reliable scientific references supporting. 
1.6. Structure and Synthesis of Chapters 
This research is divided into five parts described as follows: 
- Chapter 1 covers the introduction, research relevance and delimitations, problematic 
question, objectives and research methodology approach.  
- Chapter 2 covers the state of art that has two vital branches. The first consists in a 
critical review of Pentesting with focus on the three initial phases of PTES 
recommendation. The second consists in the critical review of Intelligence, its cycle 
and structured analytic techniques, on which we based to create the iPentest model. 
- Chapter 3 covers the result of the research – the iPentest model. On this chapter, we 
offer a detailed explanation of iPentest methodology for iPlanning and iModeling 
phases. Particularly, in the iModeling phase we present an Incident Profiling 
framework and its operationalization based on Intelligence techniques, resulting in 
the iModeling model – an Incident Profiling model.  
- Chapter 4 covers the evaluation of iModeling using real case studies as proof of 
concept. 
- Chapter 5 covers the conclusions, relevant considerations about the research, its 
limitations, an evaluation of the initial questions, and an appreciation for future 
investigations on the development of iModeling.
iPentest  
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2. RELATED WORK 
This chapter is divided into two parts: the first is dedicated to the analyzes of the penetration 
tests contributions, contexts and its methods of execution. We will detailly explore the PTES 
recommendations focusing on the three initial phases (1. Pre-engagement Interactions; 2. 
Intelligence Gathering; 3. Threat Modeling). This will be the foundation to develop our 
research. The second part is dedicated to characteristics and considerations of Intelligence, 
in order to look for a new approach on understanding this concept. Additionally, we will 
undertake a critical analysis of the traditional cycle of Intelligence by thoroughly exploring 
its phases. 
2.1.  Penetration Tests 
Pentesting consists in conducting security assessments on which an auditor (Pentester) 
employs the same techniques of a real attacker (hacker). The goal is to identify potential 
vulnerabilities or configuration failures that could lead to a breach on the security measures 
of computer science systems’, such as network infrastructures, wireless segments, websites, 
web and mobile app, and human or physical components (Dinis, 2013). 
However, there are other Pentest’s specific domains, such as critical infrastructures, that in 
many cases use owner communication protocols – which are known as protocols that are 
mainly designed and implemented by the manufacturer – therefore, they are not publicly 
available.  Another growing concern, or even potential target, is the Internet of Things (IoT) 
security. Few years ago, if we would say that a phone could be used to copy a fingerprint 
none would believe it. Nonetheless, today it is possible to say that, for instance, hackers with 
a malicious intention can use a fridge to break into bank accounts. This is known as Era of 
The Internet of Things and it is growing at a dangerously fast speed. For instance, on 17th 
July 2017, the FBI reported a case about Smart Toys (FBI, 2017), made to entertain children. 
It contains sensors, microphones, cameras, data storage and other multimedia capabilities, 
including voice recognition, GPS locations and Internet connection (via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth) 
capable of being controlled by an Android or IOS mobile device. The lack of security 
measures, such as performing periodic Pentests, put in risk children’s privacy and safety due 
to the amount of personal information that is involuntarily revealed.   
Pentesting is part of a preventative approach that ensure that vulnerabilities are not exploited. 
It assesses the reaction capability of any information technology (IT) system identifying the 
  iPentest 
 
 7 
technological capabilities that hackers need to successfully compromise that system. In this 
sense, Pentesting allows to identify system’s vulnerabilities, making it possible to implement 
suitable security measures to detect, prevent and mitigate potential threats (NIST SP 800-
115).  
It is a good practice to keep the Pentesting process consistent and auditable through 
recognized methods and recommendations, developed by experts in this field. The following 
recommendations are historically the most well-known: 
- OSSTMM – Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (2000) 
o [Institute of Security and Open Methodologies]  
- OWASP ASVS – OWASP Application Security Verification Standard Project 
(2001) 
o [OWASP Foundation] 
- NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and 
Assessment (2008) 
o [National Institute of Standards and Technology] 
- ISSAF – Information Systems Security Assessment Framework (2006) 
o [Open Information Systems Security Group] 
- PTES – Penetration Testing Executing Standard (2009) 
o [Group of Information Security Practitioners] 
 
The table below summarizes the main contributions related to recommendations in Pentest’s 
domain, already mentioned above. 
 
RECOMENDATION HISTORIC MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
OSSTMM 
ü v.1 (2000) 
ü v.2.1 (2003) 
ü v.2.2 (2006) 
ü v.3.0 (2010) 
 
ü Characterizes SegOp through an analysis and 
correlation of the results. 
ü The methodology benefits 6 types of tests: 1. 
Double Blind; 2. Tandem; 3. Reversal; 4. Blind; 5. 
Gray Box; 6. Double Gray Box; 
ü Assess the safety of the following modules: 
information; processes; Internet technologies; 
communication; wireless; physique. 
OWASP ASVS 
Project 
ü V1.0 (2009) 
ü v2.0 (2014) 
ü The standard provides a basis for testing application 
technical security controls and technical security 
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ü v3.0 (2015) 
ü v3.0.1 (2016) 
ü v.3.1 (2018) 
(spreadsheet only) 
controls in the environment, which can be used as a 
metric and guidance, and during a procurement. 
ü It has three application security verification levels: 
Level 1 meant for software; Level 2 for applications 
that contain sensitive data; Level 3 for critical 
applications that perform high value transactions 
and sensitive data, such as medical data. 
ISSAF 
ü v.0.1.5 (2005) 
ü v.0.2.1. (2006) 
ü A methodology of safety assessment, formed by two 
documents: one that focus on the aspects of business 
security and the other on penetration tests with a 
framework centralized on the tools. 
ü Consists in three sections: 1. Planning & 
Preparation; 2. Assessment (9 steps); 3. Reporting, 
Clean-up & Destroy Artefacts. 
NIST SP 
800-115 
 
ü SP 800-115 (2008) 
ü Recommendation with technical aspects to check 
the SegInfo assessment. It has models, techniques 
and tools that can be used to assess various types of 
systems and situations, and allows a cyclic process 
to assess security. 
ü The recommendation has a simplified methodology 
with four sections: 1. Planning; 2. Discovery; 3.  
Execution; 3. Post-Execution. 
ü Includes guidelines for: the security politics; the 
role of the administration in the security tests; the 
techniques of security review; the identification and 
systems analysis; the vulnerability assessment and 
analysis; vulnerability validation; Planning SegInfo 
tests; do security tests; post-test activities. 
PTES 
 
ü PTES (2009) 
ü PTES (2018) 
ü This recommendation proposes of systematization 
of the entire Pentest process with a sequence of 
procedures and alerts for considering a set of 
aspects. 
ü The recommendation has seven stages: 1. Pre-
engagement Interactions; 2. Intelligence Gathering; 
3. Threat Modeling; 4. Vulnerability Analysis; 5. 
Exploitation; 6. Post Exploitation; 7. Reporting. 
ü It’s directed to perform Pentests on: network 
infrastructures; websites; web-applications. 
Table 1 – Pentests Main Contributions 
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Despite the main contributions previously identified, these recommendations also have some 
limitations: some are very comprehensive or are outdated. For instance, regardless of 
OSSTMM evolution, it has taken a holistic approach (both for testing a GSM system and for 
a computer system), converting it into a wide recommendation for the object under analysis.  
The main advantage is that it explains very well its scenarios (1. Double Blind; 2. Tandem; 
3. Reversal; 4. Blind; 5. Gray Box; 6. Double Gray Box). However, authors have pointed as 
disadvantages a steep learning curve and a paid subscription to access to the latest version 
v4 (Herzog, 2001). 
OWASP ASVS Project consists in a checklist – with level 1 (opportunistic), 2 (standard) 
and 3 (advanced) – of items that should be covered by an application security test. Each level 
increases the complexity and quantity of tests which can be applied to web and mobile 
applications. OWASP ASVS is not a methodology to execute Pentesting, it is a granular 
checklist containing tests that are expected to be done (OWASP ASVS, 2016). 
ISSAF attempts to cover all possible domains of Pentesting from beginning to conclusion. 
It explains the distinct relationships between tasks, being focused on the tools and its 
tutorials. However, because there haven’t been new developments since 2006, the tools are 
outdated (ISSAF, 2006).  
NIST recommendation make suggestions about physical security, such as physical theft of a 
critical device of a company, also considering social engineering, such as impersonating an 
employee of a company and asking for logins systems (NIST SP 800-115).  
Finally, the PTES recommendation is a very thorough methodology to perform Pentests, 
consisting in a sequence of seven detailed phases that warns about technical as well as other 
important aspects of a Pentest, such as scope and reporting. It has detailed instructions on 
how to perform the required tasks to test the security at any environment. PTES takes an 
advantage over other recommendations, because it is inclusive of the most commonly found 
technologies and also includes not so common ones. Additionally, PTES incorporates other 
frameworks within it, it is easy to understand, adaptable to personalized Pentesting needs 
and frequently updated (Nickerson et al., n.d.). 
For these reasons this research was conducted based on the PTES recommendation.  
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2.1.1. Penetration Testing Execution Standard - PTES 
PTES is one of the most acknowledged recommendation to execute Pentests, designed to 
provide both businesses and security service providers with a common language and scope 
for executing Pentests at any environment. PTES consists in seven phases that clarify this 
test efficacy, covering everything related to a Pentest. However, this section will only focus 
on the three first phases, in order to understand its importance while performing a Pentest. 
1. Pre-engagement Interactions: the aim of this section is to present tools and 
techniques to support the initial communication with the client and the reasoning 
behind the Pentest; 
2. Intelligence Gathering: the aim of this section is to perform reconnaissance against 
a target to gather as much information as possible. This information will be then 
utilized on the threat modeling phase and when penetrating the target during the 
vulnerability assessment and exploitation phase. It defines Intelligence Gathering 
activities of a Pentest to produce a strategic attack plan; 
3. Threat Modeling: the aim of this section is to define a threat modeling approach. 
This approach is required for a correct execution of a Pentest. This phase is critical 
to evaluate the risk appetite  of the organization and prioritize and secure their critical 
assets; 
4. Vulnerability Analysis: the aim of this section is to identify systems’ weaknesses 
and applications’ flaws, such as host and service misconfiguration or insecure 
application design, which can be exploited by the attacker. Several automatized tools 
can be used, such as network/general vulnerability scanning; 
5. Exploitation: the aim of this section is to establish access to a system or resource 
avoiding security restrictions, performed through an attack simulation.  It consists on 
a customized application (exploit), according to the previous detected flaws, in order 
to identify the main organization entry point and its critical assets;  
6. Post Exploitation: the aim of this section is to determine the value of the machine 
compromised and guarantees the control of the machine for future events; 
7. Reporting: the aim of this section is to define base criteria for Pentest reporting. It 
captures the entire process of Pentesting, including information about how to fix the 
organization systems’ vulnerabilities, discovered by Pentest, and raise awareness 
about information safety.  
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2.1.1.1. Pre-Engagement Interaction Phase 
Traditionally it is known as the “Contract phase” on which the Pentester discusses the scope, 
terms and depth levels of Pentest execution with the client. The main goal is to define what 
needs to be tested, and how to test it. To do so, the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), a 
confidential agreement about the extracted information during the Pentest, needs to be 
signed. Although there are several techniques, tools and information explaining how to 
penetrate a network infrastructure, we conclude that there is a lack of developed approaches 
in Pre-Engagement Interaction phase. Neglecting this initial phase can lead Pentester to a 
flawed, non-completed final product, and even to trespassing the thin line of legality. 
Therefore, it is extremely important to inform about how to perform this phase according to 
the following tasks (see annex I – PTES: Pre-Engagement Interactions): 
 
i. Pre-engagement Interactions/Scoping 
Defining scope is one of the most important components of a Pentest but it is also one of the 
most overlooked tasks by Pentesters. Systems and technologies that should be tested are 
identified and documented. Furthermore, Pentest time estimation and costs are agreed 
between the Pentester and the client. 
 
ii. Pre-engagement Interactions/Goals 
Also known as “Goals Specification”, is in this phase that goals are stated according to the 
customer needs. It is also important to evaluate the organization technological infrastructure 
security level. For instance, if the organization has a low security level it is strongly 
recommended the execution of a previous vulnerability analysis, instead of a complete 
Pentest. 
 
iii. Pre-engagement Interactions/Testing Terms & Definitions 
The Pentester should have the ability to use an understandable language with the customer 
while explaining the technical terms and concepts.  
 
iv. Pre-engagement Interactions/Questionnaires 
Generically, questionnaires are used to collect relevant information, usually applied to 
managers and system administrators. These questions are designed to ensure Pentest 
maximum efficacy and to provide a better understanding of clients’ needs. The Pentester 
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should ask a great amount of questions or add optional ones (see annex Ia – Pre-Engagement 
Interactions: Questionnaires). 
 
v. Pre-engagement Interactions/Establish lines of Communication 
Establish lines of Communication for a quicker and efficient information transmission 
during Pentest, especially in case of emergency. A direct contact point should be pre-defined 
for eventual system failures.  
 
vi. Pre-engagement Interactions/Rules of Engagement 
The established engagement rules will allow to maintain Pentest conditions and its integrity. 
They should include Pentest methods, permissions, schedules, locations, execution times, 
and all legal considerations to protect the Pentester and its activities.  
 
vii. Pre-engagement Interactions/Capabilities & Technology in place 
Assess the organization responsiveness capability and its incident monitoring ability. The 
Pentester should perform the Pentest without conflicting with the technical team. 
 
2.1.1.2. Intelligence Gathering Phase 
Relevant data and information are collected to enable the recognition of a specific target, – 
building an image of the target – exposing its capabilities and vulnerabilities. From an 
offensive perspective, gathering information will allow a better understanding of how an 
attack can occur. For instance, through certain tools available in Open Source it is possible 
to find information about the device operating system, and if it is out of date. From a 
defensive perspective, the Pentester can assess existing vulnerabilities and implement 
preventive measures. The collection of information on organizations varies according to its 
organizational structure, its critical business assets and processes, partners and suppliers, 
financial information and others. The PTES recommends five tasks within this phase (see 
annex II – PTES: Intelligence Gathering): 
 
i. Intelligence Gathering/Target Selection 
Depending on the Pentest pre-determined scope, the target may or may not be identified.  
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When the target system information is known, Pentest is classified as “white box”. When 
there is no information it is classified as “black box”, which is an equivalent of a hacking 
attack. At this stage, the Pentester should confirm the established rules in the Pre-
Engagement phase to check the test goals and the time available to perform it. 
 
ii. Intelligence Gathering/OSINT 
This section includes the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), which is a form of Intelligence 
collection based on publicly available sources (Nickerson et al., n.d.; OSINT FMI 2-22.9, 
2006). PTES recommendation has three forms of Intelligence Gathering: Passive, Semi-
Passive, and Active. 
OSINT collection can focus on physical, logical aspects – such as business partners, 
competitors, product line, vertical market, organization events, Internet suppliers – critical 
infrastructure and financial aspects of organizations. It can also focus on the individual, by 
searching for personal information that will sketch the relational profile. 
 
iii. Intelligence Gathering/Covert Gathering 
In this section are used less conventional activities to gather information about the target. 
These activities are frequently associated with dumpster diving and with the use of HUMINT 
techniques to collect information through a physical or verbal interaction. In these situations, 
there is a direct interaction with the target, using false identification to obtain relevant 
information, such as key employees, partners/suppliers, among others. It is also considered 
a phase with direct observation of information about wireless, radio signal frequencies, 
physical security mechanisms and physical accesses.  
 
iv. Intelligence Gathering/Footprinting 
This technique consists in a physical interaction with the target to obtain both external and 
internal information about the organization. The External Footprinting includes the 
identification of hosts and systems, using different techniques, such as reverse DNS, brute 
force, port scanning, WHOIS searches, domain research and others. The Internal 
Footprinting occurs when the Pentester has access to the internal network and is able to 
analyze the packet sniffing and extracting a variety of information, such as credentials from 
unencrypted Login Session's. 
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v. Intelligence Gathering/Identify Protection Mechanisms 
Normally, organizations have certain protection mechanisms, such as firewalls and antivirus. 
Because these mechanisms can trigger alarms, it is mandatory to do a previous identification 
to maximize Pentest efficacy and minimize the detection ratio.   
 
2.1.1.3. Threat Modeling Phase 
Threat Modelling characterizes threats – threat agents and its capabilities – and allows to 
understand how a successful attack impacts on the organization and on its assets. PTES 
recommendation does not use a specific model, but recommends the use of a logical model 
in terms of its representation of threats and its impact. This phase has two key perspectives: 
(1) attacker, and (2) critical assets.  The attacker perspective settles in the identification of 
relevant threats, threats agents and their capabilities. The critical assets perspective aims to 
identify all assets, whether are physical, logical, processes, humans or other. PTES 
recommends six tasks to understand this phase (see annex III – PTES: Threat Modeling): 
 
i. Threat Modeling/Business Asset Analysis 
For assets that are most likely to be attacked should be identified whether they are tangible 
or not. Such identification is possible through interviews and document analysis, collected 
in the previous phase. 
 
ii. Threat Modeling/Business Process Analysis 
Business models works through different sets of operating processes. In this task, it is 
essential to identify and list these processes, classify them as critical or non-critical, and 
identify its flaws. This allows to understand which processes, if exploited, could be harmful 
to the organization. 
 
iii. Threat Modeling/Threat Agents & Community Analysis 
The Pentester should identify and characterize potential threat agents, and consider if they 
are internal or external to the organization (see annex IV – Threat Modeling: Threat 
Agents/Community Analysis). 
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iv. Threat Modeling/Threat Capability Analysis 
The estimation of the probability of a successful attack depends on the threat agents’ 
capabilities. This task provides an understanding about the expertise the threat agent should 
have to exploit effectively critical assets.  
 
v. Threat Modeling/Motivation Modeling 
Threat agents’ motivation should be identified and deeply analyzed. Depending on the 
organization, or even the market status quo, motivations can frequently change. Typical 
motivations are: curiosity, fun, challenge, reputation, competitiveness, profits and other 
benefits (direct or indirect), relationship matters – such as love problems (jealous and 
betrayal leads to passwords thefts, social profile and email intrusion) or partners surveillance 
– hacktivism, terrorism or even cyberwar.  
 
vi. Threat Modeling/Finding Relevant News of Comparable Organizations 
The Pentester should investigate about relevant past incidents or news related to 
organizations from the same business sector, and with parallel technological infrastructure. 
This knowledge, gained through historical analysis, such as challenges they have faced, can 
be often used as an indicator, helping to mitigate real incidents.   
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2.2. Intelligence   
From a historical and institutional perspective, the word “Intelligence” has been used to 
designate secret governmental organizations and its activities. However, this concept has not 
been unanimous. Attempts to standardize this concept instigated several discussions and 
interpretations, which mainly settles on different political, cultural or temporal perspectives.  
In 2002, Michael Warner, CIA specialist, tried to gather different perspectives, classifying 
Intelligence in two categories: official and academic. On the one hand, official definitions 
are those registered in official documents or mentioned in laws (Warner, 2002). For 
instance, the National Security Department of the USA states in their record from 1947 that 
Intelligence (in particular, Foreign Intelligence) is “information about the capabilities, 
intentions or activities of foreign governments, as well as their elements, organizations and 
foreign people” (National Security Act, 1947). Another perspective is written in Joint 
Chiefs of Staff dictionary that perceives Intelligence in two different perspectives: (1) “as a 
product, resulted from the collection, processing, integration, analysis and interpretation of 
available data and information about foreign areas or countries”; and (2) “as information 
and acknowledgement about a certain adversary, obtained through observation, 
investigation and analysis” (JP 1.02, 2001). 
On the other hand, academic perspectives refer to the commercial publications written by 
former specialists from Intelligence agencies, such as CIA. For instance, Sherman Kent 
published in 1949 the book “Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy”, on which 
Intelligence is defined as “the acknowledgement that the individuals with senior positions in 
military should have to guarantee the National Security and well-being” (Kent, 1949). 
About ten years later, in 1958, Mr. Random, also from CIA, wrote on his paper “Intelligence 
as a Science” that Intelligence is “the collection and the processing of official or secret 
information about foreign countries to help to formulate and implement external policies 
and to lead secret activities on the outside to easier implement external politic” (Random, 
1958).  Then, twenty years later, in 1978, CIA former director Veron Walter, wrote another 
definition for Intelligence: “information which aren’t always available in the public domain, 
related to force, resources, capabilities and the intentions of a foreign country, which may 
eventually affect our lives and the safety of our people” (Walters, 1978). 
After analyzing all these perspectives, we noticed that most of them focus on Intelligence as 
a product, recognizing it as a process. Therefore, these definitions neglect counter-
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Intelligence and confine this concept to military and secret governmental organizations 
(Bimfort, 1958).  
Across the years, political, cultural and even technological changes fostered the need to adapt 
and extend this concept to other domains. Even that Intelligence is mostly quoted into Law 
Enforcement domain, its definition is wider. The international Association of Chiefs of 
Police, in 2002, reported on “Criminal Intelligence Sharing” that Intelligence “is the 
combination of credible information with quality analysis—information that has been 
evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn”(IACP, 2002). In 2010, UNODC 
publications about “Criminal intelligence” suggest a mathematical formula to understand 
Intelligence concept: “Information + Evaluation = Intelligence”, where “Information is 
simply raw data of any type, whilst in contrast Intelligence is data which has been worked 
on, given added value or significance” (UNODC, 2010). 
The most recent Portuguese perspective is offered by SIRP that sees intelligence “as product 
that results from a process: information cycle”. Thus, it contemplates “the 
data/facts/information collection through human ways, documental and technological and 
their organization, analysis and assessment through proper techniques and methodologies”. 
SIRP refers that “information is an essential support tool when making political decisions, 
contributing to the safety, safeguard and national interest defense” (SIRP, 2017). 
Intelligence activity is typically associated to espionage and to the use of unconventional 
and illegal techniques and methods to obtain certain types of information. However, we 
consider that Intelligence know-how should be extended and applied to a large variety of 
domains, such as business, medical, academic sectors, among others, avoiding illegal 
approaches during the Intelligence process.  
The following sections allows to understand the Intelligence foundations, highlighting its 
characteristics, conceptual evolutions and clarifying each phase of its cycle.  
2.2.1. Data and Information 
Data is defined as attributes obtained through specific sensors, observation, experimentation 
or calculation. Data is considered a set of values or occurrences with the lowest class of 
abstraction, this is, data has no significance when isolated (Bergeron, 2003; Goldman, 
2006). Conversely, information is understood as the explanation and interpretation of raw 
data. It has a higher abstraction class, that is, information is created when data is 
contextualized, gaining a specific meaning (Bergeron, 2003). For instance, if we consider 
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isolatedly each variable, “150”, “Massive spread”, “98%” and “may”, we can’t attribute 
them a specific meaning, as represented in “Figure 1 – Raw Data”. 
 
Figure  1 – Raw Data 
However, when we look to the same raw data but within a specific context, for instance 
“Cyber-attacks”, they gain a different interpretation.  
We developed a simple exercise consisting in searching on Google for “150 massive spread 
98% may”. We found over 500 000 random results, which turns data interpretation very 
complex or even impossible. Then, we simply added the context “Cyber-attack”, searching 
now for “Cyber-attack 150 massive spread 98% may”. It was impressive that the top 10 
results reported the same: a massive ransomware (WannaCry) attack spread, occurred in 12th 
May 2017 that affected over 150 countries. It could spread through computers running 
unpatched versions of Microsoft Window. About 98% of the affected devices had some 
version of Windows1. 
The “Figure 2 – Contextualized Data” illustrates the difference after attributing a specific 
context to raw data.  
 
Figure  2 – Contextualized Data  
In conclusion, raw data cannot speak by itself, its meaning depends on the situation on which 
is interpreted. We also realized that it is possible to analyze different attributes and withdraw 
empirical correlations between things that apparently are not connected.  
 
 
 
                                               
1 Attack confirmed by Europol. Available: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/wannacry-ransomware>. [June, 
2017]. 
may
OnMay 12 a strain of ransomware 
called WannaCry spread around the 
world
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2.2.2. Intelligence Characterization 
Intelligence can be characterized in two different perspectives: as an activity and as a result 
(Kent, 1949; Random, 1958; Bimfort, 1958; Walters, 1978; Krizan, 1999; Warner, 
2002; Schulsky & Schmitt, 2002; Goldman, 2006; Lowenthal, 2008; Khan, 2009; 
McDowell, 2009). As an activity, it is defined as “production and use of information 
carefully analyzed and adapted for specific users (Krizan, 1999)”. As a result, it is 
considered a “final product derived from a process whose response materialize in many 
levels and replies to the specific needs of the decision-maker (Goldman, 2006)”.   
Intelligence products are placed in one of nine production categories: warning, target, 
current, prospective, general military, basic research, scientific and technical (S&T), identity 
intelligence (I2) and Counterintelligence (CI) (Johnson, 2007; JP 2-0, 2013) (see Figure 3 
- Intelligence Products): 
 
Figure  3 – Intelligence Products2 
The same intelligence and information can be used in each category. However, the categories 
are distinguished mainly by the purpose for which the Intelligence was produced, as 
described as follows:  
1. Warning Intelligence 
It has the purpose of providing warnings to anticipate hostile activities and assessing the 
occurrence probability of those activities (risk evaluation). It has an urgency and a time 
sensitive nature otherwise it will lose its value (Goldman, 2006; Grabo, 2010; JP 2-0, 
2013). 
2. Target Intelligence 
It has the purpose of providing portraying and locating the components of a target or complex 
target, such as networks and support infrastructures, indicating its vulnerabilities and relative 
importance. Includes physical, moving or virtual targets analysis (biographic, biologic, 
                                               
2 Note: Adapted from Johnson (2007), JP 2-0 (2013).    
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behavioral, and reputational attributes of human targets) and signature (detection and 
positive identification of targets). Target intelligence must holistically analyze the target, so 
it also includes functional systems vulnerabilities’ and damage capabilities (JP 3-60, 2013; 
CJCSI 3370.01, 2016). 
3. Current Intelligence 
It has the purpose of providing updated support for ongoing operation. It involves producing 
and delivering Intelligence about an existing incident. It also involves the integration of time-
sensitive and all-source intelligence, identifying and evaluation risks (Hedley, 2007; JP 2-
0, 2013). It aims to identify adversary’s capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, assets and 
other interesting activities (Goldman, 2006). 
4. Prospective Intelligence 
It has the purpose of forecasting incidents with a three to five years strategic orientation 
about new politics and decision-making development (Johnson, 2007). It includes a 
description of relevant actors’ capabilities and activities estimating potential consequences. 
It includes the production of alternative scenarios to support the best strategic decision 
(Hedley, 2007). 
5. General Military Intelligence (GMI) 
It has the purpose of monitoring military capabilities, identifying forces and dispositions of 
foreign countries, organizations and non-state actors that are potential threats to the military 
operations and/or national security. This category is usually associated with long-term 
planning and attempts to identify and monitor trends, including the identification of strengths 
and weaknesses, technical capabilities and infrastructure characteristics (JP 2-01, 2012). 
6. Basic Research Intelligence 
It has the purpose of providing reference data such as biographical data, geographical, 
military, economics, social, demographic and political. Results are presented in 
monographies, maps, schemes, and summaries (Johnson, 2007; Hedley, 2007). It supports 
not only the Current Intelligence but also the Prospective Intelligence (ITACG, 2011).  
7. Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) 
It has the purpose of examining foreign scientific and technical (S&T) developments with 
warfare potential. It includes S&T characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities and 
limitations. It covers the spectrum of applied sciences and technologies, including tactics, 
equipment efficiency and its systems (Johnson, 2007; JP 2-0, 2013).  
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8. Identity Intelligence (I2) 
It has the purpose of identifying links and patterns between agents that may be considered a 
threat. Results from the merge of identity attributes, such as biological characteristics, 
biographical, behavioral, reputational, relational related to individuals, and other 
information associated with those attributes. For this correlation, I2 uses Biometric-enable 
Intelligence (BEI), Forensics-enable Intelligence (FEI), and Documents and Media 
Exploitation (DOMEX) to discovery unknown threats (JP 2-0, 2013).  
9. Counterintelligence (CI) 
It has the purpose of gathering information to identify, deceive, exploit disruption, sabotage 
and any other activities of foreign entities that may be a threat. CI identifies weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities that may be exploited by an adversary, which can be used to implement 
security measures against foreign Intelligence (JP 2-0, 2013; Cleave, 2015). 
 
2.2.3. New Intelligence Paradigm 
Traditional Intelligence is comparable to puzzles where pieces are missing. Therefore, the 
goal is to gather as many pieces as possible to further analysis, using secret or publicly 
available pieces. Even if Intelligence keeps using traditional sources of classified 
information and methods, such as undercovered missions, it must devise ways to deal with 
the new challenge associated with the large amount of information available in open sources, 
which is consequence of the rapid technological evolution (Lahneman, 2010).  
This evolution also has given rise to new threats and risks within a variety of areas supported 
by technological infrastructures, threatening security in several domains and in 
nontraditional ways. Therefore, it seems that considering a new intelligence paradigm is the 
only way to deal with modern times. The new paradigm is composed of trends which have 
recently appeared in Intelligence domain, making it harder for Intelligence Services to 
provide relevant information, such as: (i)  the potential human rights encroachment and 
freedoms confines data-gathering by Intelligence Services; (ii) the requirement for 
intelligence and evidence with forensic value; (iii) the increased capacity for the 
transmission of large amounts of data and information through Internet, television and phone 
calls, makes Intelligence services unable to deal with this fast exchanging of news; (iv) the 
existing access and usability of information technology allows billions of people to use the 
Internet, but some may misuse it (Črnčec, 2009).  
  iPentest 
 
 22 
The following “Table 2 – Intelligence Evolution” offers a comparison between traditional 
Intelligence focus and its new perspectives. 
 
Table 2 – Intelligence Evolution3 
Over the years, Intelligence (military concept) has its focus on the development of the 
process behind products production, neglecting the customers’ needs. Nonmilitary threats 
are increasing in relation to military ones, requiring Intelligence to be adapted to different 
needs. In addition, the above-mentioned trends required an emerging change which led to 
open the restricted military Intelligence concept to non-military environments, such as the 
business sector. Finished Intelligence was always seen as a static Product, however, the new 
trend such as the Internet and social media networks, provided openings for rethinking this 
concept, changing it to dynamic outputs (constantly updating and disseminating information 
around the world). The new Intelligence paradigm focuses on consumer needs and 
encourages dynamic processes, such as knowledge sharing and feedback mechanisms 
between producers and consumers. It also has a well-defined audience, scope and terms, 
contemplating consumers’ needs. Even if supporting these needs leads to a more complex 
work, when compared to delivering a single product, the output (final result) is value-added 
                                               
3 Note: adapted from Lahneman, W.J. 2010; Analyst-IC Associate Teams Program (2012)   
TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOCUS NEW INTELLIGENCE GOALS
Products Outputs
Statistics & performance driven Consumer needs-driven
Static production process Analyst exchange during research/production
process (incl. outsiders)
Static products   Dynamic and static outputs
Discrete Discrete Share while protecting sources and methods
Inconsistent feedback/lacking effective feedback 
mechanisms
Effective and utilized feedback mechanisms
No defined audience Clearly defined audience
Set scopes/purposes determined by producing 
agency
Evolving and shifting scopes to meet consumer 
requirements
Analysts as producer to policymaker/decision maker Value-added producer to consumers who need the 
intelligence
Product disseminated and complete Dialogue between producer and consumer before and 
during production
Finished Intelligence Useful information and analysis to consumer
Traditional dissemination mechanisms Traditional and non-traditional dissemination (incl. 
analysts as output via social media, etc.)
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to support consumer decisions (Lahneman, W.J. 2010; Analyst-IC Associate Teams 
Program, 2012). 
2.2.4. Traditional Intelligence Cycle 
The Intelligence process is traditionally represented by the Intelligence Cycle consisting of 
five phases: 1. Planning; 2. Collection; 3. Processing; 4. Analysis and Production; 5. 
Feedback & Dissemination; as represented in “Figure 4 – Traditional Intelligence Cycle”. 
 
Figure  4 – Traditional Intelligence Cycle4 
The Intelligence cycle is the process of transforming raw information into finished 
Intelligence. It can be restarted if the final output does not match with the requirements 
defined in the first phase. All phases ensure that the process flows correctly thought an 
auditable system of checks and balances. In the next sections we describe each phase 
(Krizan, 1999; Goldman, 2006; Studies in Intelligence, 2012; CIA, 2013, JP 2-0, 2013; 
Fiães, 2014; Omand, 2014): 
 
i. Phase 1 – Planning & Direction 
In this phase Intelligence needs are identified and transformed into Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIR) that are high priority information, and into Other Information 
Requirements (OIR) that are minor priority information. For each PIR/OIR a set of questions 
(5W2H), such as “What? Who? Where? Why? When? How? How much?”, should be 
answered in order to identify what is known and unknown (see Figure 5 – Intelligence 
                                               
4 Note: adapted from Krizan, 1999; Goldman, 2006; Studies in Intelligence, 2012; CIA, 2013; JP 2-0, 2013. 
Planning & 
Direction
Collection
ProcessingAnalysis & Production
Feedback & 
Dissemination
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Needs). This phase is seen as the macro management of the entire Intelligence cycle 
activities. Therefore, should be created a research plan to identify which questions should be 
researched to answer to PIR/OIR, identify sources of information, and identify means and 
forms of information gathering. This plan also outlines all needed resources; defines the 
useful time-life of information, allowing Intelligence to be targeted, precise and timely; and 
follows the entire Intelligence process as a chain of custody (Goldman, 2006; ITACG, 
2011; CJCSM 3314.01A, 2012; JP 2-0, 2013; Fiães, 2014). 
 
Figure  5 – Intelligence Needs5 
 
ii. Phase 2 – Collection 
This phase is characterized by a dynamic and continuous process of research and collection 
of raw data to satisfy the requirements specified in the Planning & Direction phase. This 
phase is managed through a Collection Plan (dynamic plan), that has the objective of 
selecting the most appropriate sources of data collection to satisfy with effectiveness the 
Intelligence needs. When adjustments to the Collection Plan are made, analysts must inform 
their supervisors. It is also on this phase that Information is classified according to type 
(private or public) and source (confidential or open) (see annex VI – Information 
Classification) (Goldman, 2006; FMI 2-22.9, 2006). Intelligence can also be characterized 
according to means of collection: Human collection and Technological collection, as 
represented in the diagram “Figure 6 - Intelligence Collection Source”. 
                                               
5 Note: adapted from Fiães, 2014. 
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 Figure  6 – Intelligence Collection Source 
Human collection consists in the collection of data and information through human sources, 
i.e. a human element is used as source of Intelligence through direct, incentive or emotional 
approaches using deception techniques such as interviewing (debriefings or interrogations) 
and elicitation (FM 2-22.3, 2006, West 2006, Hitz, 2007). Technological collection consists 
in the collection of data and information through technological sources, i.e. technological 
elements that are used as source of Intelligence, which can be classified as Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT); Imagery Intelligence (IMINT); Measurements and Signatures 
Intelligence (MASINT) and Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) (Richelson, 2007; 
George et al., 2008; Omand et al., 2012). Both, Human collection and Technological 
collection, can be used to apply Counterintelligence (CI). CI refers to information and 
activities conduced to protect against other Intelligence services, such as espionage, 
manipulation or sabotage operations, and can be seen in three perspectives: (1) collective; 
(2) defensive; and (3) offensive. The first consists in gathering information about the 
adversary Intelligence collection capabilities. The second refers to conducting 
countermeasures to mitigate hostile penetration activities. And the third consists on 
manipulating adversary Intelligence with false information or turning its agents in double 
agents (West, 2006, JP 2-0, 2013, Cleave, 2015).  
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Lastly, all investigations begin with data that is available openly (OSINT data) and with data 
that is not (Non-OSINT data). Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is defined as legal 
collection of data and information that can be accessed without special authorization or 
associations. Such type of data may be Geographical Data (postcodes, street names); 
Statistical Data; Electoral Register; Court Records; Social Media; Blogging Platforms; 
Search Engines; Internet Archive; Freedom of Information6(NATO, 2001; Gibson, 2004; 
Lowenthal, 2006; Graça, 2010; Day, et al., 2016). Non-OSINT Data refers to data that has 
not been made publicly available, due to being under a proprietary/company or restricted 
license, such as Criminal Records, Financial Records, Telecommunication Records, Medical 
Records, Imagery, Sensors and Video Data (Omand et al., 2012; Day, et al., 2016). It is 
also on this phase that gathered data and information are subjected to an evaluation, ensuring 
its consistency, usefulness and confidence through evaluations matrices (see annex VII – 
Evaluation Matrix). 
 
iii. Phase 3 – Processing  
This phase consists in processing raw collected data and converting it into a usable and 
organized format. Typically, the Collection phase produces large amounts of unfiltered data 
that should be converted into an eligible form. The Processing phase includes signal 
decryption, imagery exploitation, documents and media translation and decoding, data 
conversion and correlation. It prepares raw data entry to database processing (Goldman, 
2006; JP 2.0, 2013; JP 1-02, 2016).  
 
iv. Phase 4 – Analysis & Production 
During this phase Intelligence is produced from the information gathered by the Collection 
phase. All processed information goes through a process of integration, evaluation, analysis 
and interpretation to create products (see Figure 3 – Intelligence Products Taxonomy) that 
will satisfy PIRs. This phase has two steps: (1) analysis, and (2) production. The first, 
Analysis, consists in the integration of available data into a context, producing value-added 
information to the consumer (Goldman, 2006; Mangio & Wilkinson, 2008; JP 2.0, 2013). 
Analysis step allows to establish links and assign meanings. It is supported by Structured 
Analytical Techniques (SAT) which helps to externalize internal processes in a systematic 
                                               
6 Freedom of Information is related to the public having access to information held by governmental 
organizations (Day, et al. 2016). 
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and transparent way (see section 2.2.5. Structured Analytic Techniques). Each SAT leaves a 
trail allowing others analysts to follow and see the foundation of an analytic judgment, 
avoiding as well cognitive biases and intuitive traps (Heuer & Pherson, 2011). The second, 
Production, consists in the preparation of the results that can be presented in reports, 
briefings, and estimates (Goldman, 2006, JP 2.0, 2013). A proper language should be used 
to estimate probability of occurrence or links between events and to assess hypotheses 
degrees of confidence (see annex VIII – Qualitative Language). 
 
v. Phase 5 – Feedback & Dissemination 
Feedback consists in a dialog between Intelligence producers and consumers that should 
continuously occur before and after Intelligence is delivered. The feedback mechanism is 
useful to assess if the finished Intelligence meets the initial needs of Intelligence and to report 
required adjustments (if there are inconsistencies, Intelligence cycle should be restarted). 
Intelligence processes ends with Dissemination. This process consists in the diffusion of the 
finished Intelligence to who requested the Intelligence, that is, when it reaches the decision 
makers. Those who are responsible for Intelligence dissemination must guarantee the 
integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of all activities during the process (Goldman, 
2006; Lowenthal, 2008).  
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2.2.5. Structured Analytic Techniques  
There are four main methods used in Intelligence analysis: (1) quantitative methods using 
empirical data, (2) quantitative methods using expert-generated data, (3) expert judgments, 
and (4) structured analysis, which are represented in “Figure 7 – Intelligence Analytical 
Techniques” (Clark, 2007; Heuer & Pherson, 2011). 
 
Figure  7 – Intelligence Analytical Techniques7 
None of these methods is preferential, they are all necessary to optimize chances to find 
adequate results. The best practice is to use multiple methods to get accurate results. 
Quantitative methods using empirical data consist in the use of collected data from any type 
of sensors, i.e. network traffic analysis (which allows to identify the sources and destinies of 
traffic, or even packets numbers to detect DDoS attacks). Conversely, quantitative methods 
using expert-generated data consist in evaluations obtained through decision analysis, 
Bayesian inferences, dynamic models and simulations. Moreover, expert judgment which is 
also known as intuitive analysis, refers to expert opinions based on evidence reasoning, 
critical thinking, historical analysis, case study analysis and reasoning by analogy. There are 
also structured techniques (SAT) that helps to reduce the adverse effects that may result from 
experts’ cognitive limitations and manipulations. These techniques consist in the 
externalization and decomposition of thinking, in such a methodical way that it can be 
                                               
7 Note: adapted from Heuer & Pherson, 2011 
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reviewed and criticized step by step by other experts (Lefebre, 2004; Heuer & Pherson, 
2011). SAT has eight categories, each one with a specific purpose, as explained following: 
1. Decomposition & Visualization 
The large amount of data and information to be analyzed is often a limitation because 
most people only have the capacity to keep in the working memory about seven (plus two 
or less two) things at the same time. As the complexity increases also the number of 
variables increases, so it is very difficult to conduct analysis without errors only based on 
our head. There are two approaches for dealing with such complexity: (1) Decomposition, 
which divide things into components in order to deal with each part separately; (2) 
Visualization, which place the divided parts on paper or on computer in an organized 
way, such as lists, matrices, maps, trees, in order to visualize the existing relations; 
2. Idea Generation  
It has the purpose of encouraging the creation of new ideas, allowing to broaden the 
horizons to different perspectives and premises. Combining old ideas with new 
perspectives is essential. However, generating new ideas or producing divergent ideas is 
more effective in group than individually. Techniques such as brainstorming, quadrant 
crunching, general morphological analysis and cross-impact matrix are really useful to 
identify different perspectives and stimulation new ideas.  
3. Scenarios, Signposts & Indicators 
The human mind tends to see the expected and to ignore the unpredictable. Some events 
are not easily predicable and the best approach to determine future outcomes is Scenario 
Analysis. Generating alternative scenarios provides a set of outlined options with value 
added for the decision maker. Including impact/low probability scenarios, such as 
signposts and indicators, is useful to delivery early warnings about significant changes. 
These changes sometimes are so gradual that we do not perceive it, or consider it 
pertinent. Therefore, the identification of indicators, flags and scenarios allows the 
creation of efficient mechanisms for rationalization. 
4. Hypothesis Generation & Testing 
The most common cause of Intelligence flaws lays on bounded mental models and 
intuitive judgments. Generation and testing hypotheses process is a core element of 
Intelligence analysis and it is supported by the collection and presentation of evidences. 
This process requires two parts: the first part describes techniques to formulate and 
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categorize hypotheses, such as Simple Hypotheses, Multiple Hypotheses Generator, 
Quadrant Hypothesis; the second part describes techniques to test hypothesis, such as 
Diagnostic Reasoning, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, Argument Mapping, 
Deception Detection. 
5. Assessment of Cause & Effect 
Attempts to explain the past or the future having as basis the understanding of a root cause 
and its effect. This understanding gets difficult when variables and relationships in study 
have no theory behind or are unpredictable, such as the human behavior. This analysis is 
tendentially conditioned by the analyst perception and experience. Techniques such as 
Key Assumptions Check, Structured Analogies, Role Playing, Red Hat Analysis, 
Outside-In Thinking, Policy Outcomes Forecasting Model and Prediction Markets are 
useful to mitigate cognitive pitfalls involved in analysts’ judgments. 
6. Challenging Mindset 
It has the purpose of challenging established mental models, broadening minds to other 
possible explanations. The analytic mental model (mindset) is a key factor for the failure 
because when external conditions change the mental model usually does not follow the 
change. For instance, mental models which have been provided truthful assessments and 
estimations for years are resistant to changing mindsets. Techniques such as the 
Premortem Analysis, Delphi method, What if? Analysis, High Impact/Low Probability 
Analysis, Red Team Analysis and Devil's Advocacy, are great techniques to mitigate 
preconceived mental models, exposing diverse perspectives on a certain subject or 
evidence; 
7. Conflict Management 
It has the purpose of managing different mindsets that usually leads to confrontation of 
views to become instead a grow learning experience. Conflict Management techniques 
should also be used when there is a high degree of uncertainty about a certain point of 
view. Techniques such as Key assumptions check, the Nosenko approach, Argument 
mapping and Joint escalation, are really useful when dealing with analytical conflicts; 
8. Decision Support 
Given the limitations of human short-term memory, it is easy to forget all pros and cons 
when we have simultaneous options. The focus will be on one option at each time which 
leads to fragile decisions. Techniques such as SWOT Analysis, Decision Matrices, Force 
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Field Analysis and Pros-Cons-Faults- and-Fixes (PCFF), places all the options and their 
relationships in graphical format which helps to overcome this cognitive limitation.  
 
Each of the previous referred categories has specific techniques (see Figure 8 – Structured 
Analytic Techniques) that can be used to deal with an extensive variety of subjects. The 
challenging task is knowing how to select the right technique to apply on a particular 
scenario. However, there has been made a remarkable effort in grouping these techniques 
considering specific scenarios (see Figure 9 – Selecting the right technique) (Heuer & 
Pearson, 2011). 
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Figure  8 – Structured Analytic Techniques8 
 
Figure  9 – Selecting the right techniques8 
  
                                               
8 Note. Heuer & Pherson, 2011. 
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3. iPENTEST PROPOSAL 
This chapter begins with the explanation of iPentest methodology, which offers an 
improvement proposal for PTES Pre-Engagement Interactions and Threat Modeling phase. 
iPentest proposal brings two value added innovations for the execution of Pentests and for 
the scientific community: the first iPentest methodology highlight relies on the improvement 
of Pre-Engagement Interactions phase, henceforth named Planning & iScenario phase. To 
this phase we added a structured thinking toolkit which increases the Pentesting planning 
efficiency. We also proposed a methodology that offers the possibility to execute the 
Pentesting directing it to specific scenarios (iScenario); the second highlight relies on the 
Threat Modeling phase where we proposed a solution to fill the existing gap from PTES 
Threat Modeling phase. This solution, henceforth named iModeling Universe of attributes, 
can be applied on three different contexts: (1) Penetration testing mapping; (2) 
Cybercriminal investigation; (3) Cyber risk analysis. 
(1) Penetration testing mapping: this approach is based on Penetration testing mapping 
for current or prospective security status assessment. It can be used for both, 
defensive (Pentester) and offensive (hacker) perspectives;  
(2) Cybercriminal investigation: this approach is based on criminal cyber incident 
mapping. It can be used for criminal investigation analysis in that it allows the 
identification of potential criminal root causes and the creation of cyber-crime 
profiling; 
(3) Cyber risk analysis: this approach is based on Cyber risk analysis, determining the 
impact of business assets and processes within the organization. It can be used for 
several purposes such as Information Security Assessment, General Data Protection 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) compliance, or Cyber insurance assessment.   
3.1.  Methodology 
The Pentest begins with the pre-engagement phase, which involves talking with customers 
and evaluating their needs and expectations. It is possible to gather great information about 
customer’s organization and infrastructure even before interacting with the technological 
infrastructure. However, gathering correct information is a hard task to complete, 
particularly when the plan is not properly prepared. Therefore, we considered urgent to 
design an approach that could help to improve Pentesting results. iPentest methodology was 
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created applying Intelligence techniques on both, Planning and Threat Modeling phase, as 
represented in the “Figure 10 – iPentest methodology”. 
 
 
Figure  10 – iPentest Methodology 
iPentest Methodology consists in the following seven phases: 1. Planning & iScenario; 2. 
Intelligence Gathering; 3. Threat Modeling; 4. Vulnerability Analysis; 5. Exploitation; 6. 
Post Exploitation; 7. Feedback & Report. This methodology offers the PTES 
recommendation a proposal improvement for the Pre-engagement Interaction phase and 
Threat Modeling phase, hereinafter referred as Planning and Threat Modeling phase. The 
advantage of both phases it’s the integration of analytical Intelligence techniques 
contributing to more precise and efficient Pentesting. Each phase is explained in detail in the 
succeeding sections. Minor, but not less important, we propose a slight adjustment on PTES 
last phase (7. Report), which consists on adding a feedback mechanism between Pentester 
and Customers before the Report delivery.  
3.1.1. Planning phase 
The Planning phase aims to perceive customer’s needs and to define the Pentesting scope 
(what is to be tested and how the Pentest will be conducted). This phase is indispensable to 
improve Pentesting results by aiding better focus and reducing scope ambiguity, as well to 
Pentesters coordination, control, resource and time management. Yet, the Planning phase 
continues to be frequently overlooked by Pentesters (Nickerson et al., n.d). 
Therefore, our proposal for iPentest Planning phase offers Pentesters a reflection tool 
(structured thinking methodology) useful for processing customer’s needs, which will 
guarantee time saving, increase research efficiency as well as the quality of Pentest results. 
Also, applying Decomposition & Visualization and Idea Generation techniques on the first 
phase of Pentests helps to anticipate Pentester actions and to develop specific observables 
about customer’s needs. 
iPentest Planning phase begins with two tasks: (i) Define iNeeds; (ii) Systematize iNeeds. 
The first task, designated Define iNeeds, consist in listening, reflecting and processing the 
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customer needs in a structured manner. It can be accomplished by using Questionnaires and 
then applying SAT such as Getting Started Checklists, Customer Checklist and Issue 
redefinition (Heuer & Pearson, 2011). The second task, designated by Systematize iNeeds, 
consists on creating a working plan that defines the major steps to reach the defined iNeeds 
and includes resource scheduling. It also serves as a communication tool between the 
Pentester and the customer, a high-level document that helps non-technical individuals to 
understand the Pentest. It can be accomplished by using SAT such as Roadmaps, 
Chronologies & Timelines, Ranking-Scoring-Prioritizing, Matrices and Network Analysis 
(Heuer & Pearson, 2011). 
 
Another innovation for the first phase of iPentest methodology is the possibility the customer 
has to select specific Scenarios (iScenario) for the Pentest. iScenario options are place in one 
from eight categories: iCurrent, iWarning, iFuture, iDecision, iHypotheses, iDeception, 
iChallenge, iConflicting (see Figure 11 – iPentest: Planning & iScenario). This allows the 
Pentester to follow a methodology that will help him to focus the Pentest on the selected 
category. These categories are distinguished from each other’s according to their purpose as 
described below: 
1. iCurrent 
It has the purpose of providing updated Intelligence about the current security status. 
Intelligence Gathering and consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner to return 
results about existing risks to Business assets and processes; 
2. iWarning 
It has the purpose of providing early warnings to anticipate hostile activities, avoiding 
unexpected surprises. Intelligence Gathering and consequently Reporting will be structured 
in a manner to assess the probability of these hostile actions to occur and its impact to 
Business assets and processes; 
3. iFuture 
It has the purpose of forecasting hostile incidents and trends. Intelligence Gathering and 
consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner to characterize relevant actors, its 
capabilities, threats and its consequences to Business assets and processes; 
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4. iDecision 
It has the purpose of supporting business managers in deciding between alternative courses 
of action. Intelligence Gathering and consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner 
to decision support and includes the design actionable conclusions to Business assets and 
processes; 
5. iHypotheses 
It has the purpose of generating and testing alternative hypotheses. Intelligence Gathering 
and consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner to provide alternative scenarios 
related to Business assets and processes; 
6. iDeception 
It has the purpose of detecting deception. Intelligence Gathering and consequently Reporting 
will be structured in a manner to evaluate the possibility of deception to Business assets and 
processes and includes the design of a treatment plan to reduce deception; 
7. iChallenge 
It has the purpose of challenging existing mental models. Intelligence Gathering and 
consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner to challenge mindsets, generate new 
ideas and includes an assessment of cause effect to Business assets and processes; 
8. iConflicting 
It has the purpose of challenging conflicting mental models or opinions. Intelligence 
Gathering and consequently Reporting will be structured in a manner to design a plan to 
managing conflicts that may affect business assets and processes. 
 
The previously mentioned scenarios are reached through the combination of different SAT 
(Figure 12 – iPentest: Planning & iScenario SAT) and vary according to its purposes. When 
dealing with complex problems it’s recommended to use multiple techniques 
simultaneously. For instance, the customer is deeply concerned that unexpected surprises 
against its business assets and processes may occur, and decides to select iWarning scenario. 
Subsequently, the Pentester will gather and organize Information using “3. Scenarios, 
Signposts & Indicators” techniques, such as Alternative Futures Analysis and Indicators, 
and “6. Challenging Mindsets” techniques, such as What If? Analysis, Devil’s Advocacy, 
High/Low Impact Probability Analysis and Red Team Analysis (Heuer & Pearson, 2011). 
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The Pentesting Report will highlight warnings about unexpected and hostile activities 
against Business assets and processes. 
 
 
Figure  11 – iPentest: Planning & iScenario 
 
 
Figure  12 – iPentest: Planning & iScenario SAT 
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3.1.2. Threat Modeling phase 
The Threat modeling phase defines a Threat Modeling approach for a correct execution of a 
Pentest as required on PTES. This phase offers a specific model, named iModeling Universe 
attributes, based on Intelligence techniques and built through the combination of recognized 
cyber security incident profiling taxonomies. Therefore, the iModeling Universe of attributes 
is a consistent model on the representation of its agents, capabilities and motivations; cyber 
threats, vulnerabilities, accesses and exploitability; operating and knowledge assets, 
informational, operational, business impact and risk rating scale.  
The following section describes iModeling Universe of attributes classes, dimensions and 
attributes, while the subsequent section describes iModeling Universe of attributes Engine 
for which we used Intelligence techniques. 
 
3.2. iModeling Universe of attributes  
In this section it’s explained how iModeling Universe of attributes was created (see Figure 
14 – iPentest: iModeling Universe of attributes). Resulting from the multiple combination 
of recognized cyber security incident profiling taxonomies (Howard & Longstaff, 1998; 
Lough, 2001; Stanton, et al., 2005; Harrison & White 2011; Mitre 2016; Enisa, 2018), 
iModeling is predominantly represented by the following three classes: 1. Agent Profiling, 
2. Attack Profiling, 3. Impact Profiling. Each one of these three classes have subclasses, 
where each subclass has dimensions and finally each dimension has several attributes (see 
Figure 13 – iModeling Universe of attributes nomenclature). Combining the attributes 
contained in each class, the result of iModeling offers a detailed cyber incident profiling that 
can be applied to different customer needs (Penetration testing mapping; Cybercriminal 
investigation; Cyber risk analysis). 
 
Figure  13 – iModeling Universe of attributes nomenclature  
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1. Agent Profiling 
This profiling class offers a detailed characterization of human and cyber threats. It describes 
the Source of the attack, bearing in mind that we are only facing a threat if there is a human 
Agent, with Motivation and Capability to perform out the desired action. The Capability 
which is understood as the ability to successfully compromise the organization, depends on 
agent’s Knowledge and Available Tools which are based on the existing Cyber Threats. The 
combination of these three subclasses (Source, Capability, Cyber Threat) provides 
organizations a clear illustration of the threats they face. These subclasses are divided into 
five dimensions: Agent (Source), Motivation (Source), Knowledge (Capability), Available 
Tool (Capability), Top Cyber Threats (Cyber Threat) (Howard & Longstaff, 1998; Enisa, 
2018).  
1.A. Agent (Source) 
The Agent dimension is related to the human threat, an individual or community of 
individuals (see annex IV – Threat Modeling: Threat Agents/Community Analysis; see 
Table 2 – Agent Classification). This dimension has the following attributes (Howard & 
Longstaff, 1998; Nickerson et al., n.d): 
1.A.1. External – includes script kiddies, hacktivists, Cybercriminals, nation states, 
cyber terrorists; 
1.A.2. Internal – includes employees, management system administrators, developers, 
engineers, technicians;  
1.A.3. Partners – includes competitors, suppliers, business vendors, outsourcing 
support. 
 
AGENT CLASSIFICATION 
Threat 
Agents 
Examples 
Characteristics 
Trust Privileges Detailed Description 
External - Script Kiddies 
- Hacktivists 
- Cybercriminals 
- Nation States 
- Cyber Terrorists 
No No 
External individuals with malicious intends that 
collect publicly information to gain information 
about the corporation. This may include former 
employees with still-active access. 
Internal - Employees 
- Management 
- System 
Administrators 
- Developers 
- Engineers 
- Technicians 
High High 
Persons working directly and inside the company 
with direct access to information about technology 
in use. Given their position and function inside the 
company they may have access to privileged 
information. 
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Partners - Competitors 
- Suppliers and 
Vendors 
- Outsourcing Support 
Mediu
m Medium 
Business Partners may have access to corporate 
culture, information about technologies in use and 
other potential items of interested to successful 
execute the attack. 
Table 2 – Agent Classification9 
 
1.B. Motivation (Source) 
The Motivation behind a cyber-attack is constantly changing and indicates whether the 
agent’s intentions are deliberate or accidental. This dimension has the following attributes 
(Gandhi et al, 2011; Nickerson, et al., n.d):  
1.B.1. Social-Cultural – includes attacks with philosophical, theological, and 
humanitarian goals, or are performed for fun, curiosity, desire for publicity or ego; 
1.B.2. Economic – includes direct or indirect profit such as theft of intellectual 
property, economically valuable assets, fraud, espionage, sabotage, blackmailing, 
or economic recession and greed;  
1.B.3. Political – include destroying, disrupting or taking control of targets, protests 
or retaliatory actions, cyberespionage and political statements;  
1.B.4. Unaware – include insiders with unintentional actions or uninformed of 
security issues.  
1.C. Knowledge (Capability) 
This dimension defines the agent’s level of cyber and kinetic knowledge to perform 
actions against the organization with proficiency. The Knowledge is quantified in the 
following three attributes (Sandia, 2007):  
1.C.1. Low (L) – agent is capable of using novice proficiency to perform his actions. 
Agent has low to moderate of practical knowledge training and no theoretical 
knowledge;  
1.C.2. Medium (M) – agent is capable of using intermediate proficiency to perform 
his actions. Agent has highly practical knowledge training and low to moderate 
theoretical knowledge; 
1.C.3. High (H) – agent is capable of using expert proficiency to perform his 
actions. Agent has both expert practical and theoretical knowledge. 
 
 
                                               
9 Note: adapted from Howard & Longstaff, 1998; Nickerson et al., n.d. 
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1.D. Available Tools (Capability) 
This dimension defines the mean used to exploit a computer or network vulnerability. 
Tools can also be more or less sophisticated, efficient and effective. This dimension has 
the following attributes (Howard & Longstaff, 1998):  
1.D.1. Physical Attack; 
1.D.2. Information Exchange;  
1.D.3. User Command;  
1.D.4. Script or Program; 
1.D.5. Autonomous Agent;  
1.D.6. Toolkit;  
1.D.7. Distributed Tool; 
1.D.8. Data Trap. 
1.E. Top Cyber Threats (Cyber Threat) 
This dimension represents the current threat landscape, resulting from the OSINT 
collection, analysis and assessment effort that has taken in place in the entire year of 2017. 
This dimension has the following attributes (ENISA, 2018): 
1.E.1. Social Engineering (see Annex IX– Social Engineering Attacks); 
1.E.2. Spam;  
1.E.3. Identity Theft; 
1.E.4. Information Leakage; 
1.E.5. Data Breaches; 
1.E.6. Web-based attacks;  
1.E.7. Web-application attacks;  
1.E.8. Malware; 
1.E.9. Exploit Kits; 
1.E.10. Denial of Service; 
1.E.11. Botnets; 
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1.E.12. Ransomware; 
1.E.13. Cyber Espionage. 
 
2. Attack Profiling 
This profiling class offers a detailed characterization of the attack, which mostly results from 
an unauthorized approach. It describes the existing Vulnerabilities and the actions to breach 
and gain Access to organization systems. The joint of these two subclasses (Vulnerability 
and Access) provides organizations a clear illustration of the attack vector. These subclasses 
are divided into five dimensions: Attack (Vulnerability), Exploitability (Vulnerability), 
Action (Access), Target (Access) and Unauthorized Result (Access) (Howard & Longstaff, 
1998).  
2.F. Vulnerability 
This dimension represents system weaknesses that may result in unauthorized access to 
organization systems. This dimension has the following attributes (CVE Details, 2017): 
2.F.1. Denial of Service; 
2.F.2. Code Execution;  
2.F.3. Buffer Overflow; 
2.F.4. Memory Corruption; 
2.F.5. SQL Injection; 
2.F.6. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS);  
2.F.7. Directory Transversal;  
2.F.8. HTTP Response Splitting; 
2.F.9. Bypass something; 
2.F.10. Gain Information; 
2.F.11. Gain Privileges; 
2.F.12. File Inclusion; 
2.F.13. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). 
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2.G. Exploitability 
This dimension defines a temporal metric that is used to measure the likelihood of attacks 
against vulnerabilities based on the current state of exploitation techniques or code 
availability. This dimension has the following attributes (FIRST, 2017): 
2.G.1. Not defined – does not influence; 
2.G.2. Unproven – no exploitation code or theoretical code;  
2.G.3. Proof-of-Concept – code is available but not functional in all situations, it 
requires substantial modification by a proficient threatening agent; 
2.G.4. Functional – code is available and it works in most situations where the 
vulnerability exists; 
2.G.5. High – autonomous functional code is available with no need for manual 
trigger, and works in every situation. 
2.H. Action  
This dimension represents agent’s activities or processes that results in a change of 
systems status. This dimension has the following attributes (Howard & Longstaff, 1998; 
IEEE, 2000):  
2.H.1. Probe – determine the characteristics of target; 
2.H.2. Scan – determine which targets have a particular characteristic; 
2.H.3. Flood – overload target’s capacity; 
2.H.4. Authenticate – accessing and assuming an authentication process; 
2.H.5. Bypass – avoid a process using an alternative exploitation method to access 
a target; 
2.H.6. Spoff – providing masquerade information to access the target; 
2.H.7. Read – obtain content from the target; 
2.H.8. Copy – reproduce content without changing the target; 
2.H.9. Modify – change the content of a target; 
2.H.10. Steal – take content from the target; 
2.H.11. Delete – remove content from the target and make it irreversible. 
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2.I. Target 
This dimension represents logical (L) or physical (P) entities for which the Action is 
directed. This dimension has the following attributes (Howard & Longstaff, 1998): 
2.I.1. Account (L); 
2.I.2. Process (L); 
2.I.3. Data (L); 
2.I.4. Component (P); 
2.I.5. Computer (P); 
2.I.6. Network (P); 
2.I.7. Internetwork (P). 
2.J. Unauthorized Result 
This dimension represents the reasonable end of a successful attack. To achieve it, the 
Agent had to use an Available Tool to exploit a Vulnerability resulting in an unauthorized 
Access against a specific Target. This dimension has the following attributes (Howard & 
Longstaff, 1998): 
2.J.1. Increased Access; 
2.J.2. Disclosure of Information; 
2.J.3. Corruption of Information; 
2.J.4. Denial of Service; 
2.J.5. Theft of Resources. 
 
3. Impact Profiling 
This profiling class offers a detailed characterization of impact. It describes Assets and the 
Impact if affected. Assets are the desired tangible or intangible (operating and knowledge) 
resources that may lead to several consequences if any kind of action against them occur. 
They are valuable to execute ongoing operations of a corporation, and consequently generate 
different kinds of Impact (informational, operational and business) to organizations. The 
joint of these two subclasses (Assets and Impact) provides organizations a clear illustration 
of cyber risk. These subclasses are divided into seven dimensions: Operating Assets (Assets), 
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Knowledge Assets (Assets), Informational (Impact), Operational (Impact), Business 
(Impact) and Risk (Impact) (Nickerson, et al., n.d). 
3.K. Operating Asset 
This dimension represents tangible ongoing operation business assets. This dimension has 
the following attributes (Baybutt, 2003; Nickerson, et al., n.d): 
3.K.1. Peopleware – such as Executive Management; Executive; Assistants; Middle 
Management; Administrative Assistants; Technical/Team Leads; Engineers; 
Technicians; Human Resources; 
3.K.2. Client Software – such as Corporation Applications; Browser; Webmail; 
Cloud Services; Self-Service Kiosk; 
3.K.3. Server Software – such as Server Information; Server Data Base; 
3.K.4. Workstations – such as PCs, Laptops, Mobile, Tablets; 
3.K.5. Servers – such as SCADA systems; Backups; Printers; Surveillance System; 
3.K.6. Data Network Infrastructure – such as Wire system; Active Network 
Equipment, such as Hubs, Switch, Router, Bridge, Network Cards; 
3.K.7. General support systems – such as HVAC; Humidity control, Smoke and 
fire detector; Halon system; Biometric Access; Electric Power; Backup Power 
Generation. 
3.L. Knowledge Asset 
This dimension represents intangible ongoing operation business assets. This dimension 
has the following attributes (Nickerson, et al., n.d): 
3.L.1. Policies, Plans & Procedures; 
3.K.2. Product Information;  
3.K.3. Marketing Information; 
3.K.4. Financial Information; 
3.K.5. Technical Information; 
3.K.6. Employee Data; 
3.K.7. Customer Data. 
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3.M. Informational Impact  
This dimension consists in the characterization of information security elements (CIA 
triad). This dimension has the following attributes (ISO/IEC 27001:2013): 
3.M.1. Confidentiality – assure data is confidential and held by individuals that are 
authorized. For instance, disclosure of information affects Confidentiality; 
3.M.2. Integrity – assure that people are not intentionally or accidentally tampering 
with the data that the organization holds. For instance, log tampering, modify data, 
configurations or privileges, fraudulent transactions, software installation and 
misappropriation affects Integrity; 
3.M.3. Availability – assure data is not lost with redundancy of systems and 
backups. For instance, destruction, loss, interruption, degradation and encryption 
affects Availability. 
3.N. Operational Impact  
This dimension consists in the characterization of the operational impact to the 
organization. This dimension has the following attributes (Simmons et al, 2009): 
3.N.1. Misuse of Resources – abusive and unauthorized actions related to certain 
functions and privileges; 
3.N.2. User Compromise – unauthorized access and use of a specific host privilege; 
3.N.3. Root Compromise – unauthorized action against a System that to gain 
Administrative Privileges; 
3.N.4. Web Compromise – website or Web application vulnerabilities exploitation 
to compromise Information; 
3.N.5. Installed Malware – gain full control of the compromised system to access 
to Sensitive information or remote control of the host (e.g. Virus; Spyware; Trojan; 
Worms; Arbitrary Code); 
3.N.6. Denial of Service – deny access to a particular resource or service (e.g. Host 
based; Network Based; DDoS). 
3.O. Business Impact  
This dimension consists in the characterization of potential consequences for the business 
model. This dimension has the following attributes (Nickerson, et al., n.d): 
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3.O.1. Nuisance; 
3.O.2. Damage to Reputation and Confidence; 
3.O.3. Compliance or Regulatory Incidents; 
3.O.4. Loss of Intellectual Property; 
3.O.5. Production Disruption; 
3.O.6. Physical Equipment Damage; 
3.O.7. Financial Losses; 
3.O.8. Data Destruction and Loss of Data Integrity; 
3.O.9. System Sabotage or Shutdown. 
3.P. Risk  
This dimension defines a metric that is used to assess the risk of controls being 
compromised and its financial consequences. This dimension has the following attributes 
(ISO 15408:2005; Nickerson, et al., n.d): 
3.P.1. Low – Low risk of security being compromised; Negative Impact as result; 
3.P.2. Moderate – Moderate risk of security being compromised; Limited financial 
losses as result; 
3.P.3. Elevated – Elevated risk of security being compromised; Material financial 
losses as result; 
3.P.4. High – High risk of security being compromised; Significant financial losses 
as result; 
3.P.5. Extreme – Extreme risk of security being compromised; Catastrophic 
financial losses as result. 
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Figure  14 – iPentest: iModeling Universe of attributes 
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3.2.1.  iModeling Universe of attributes Engine 
This section offers a conceptual review and analysis about iModeling Universe of attributes 
Engine for which we used SAT.  In the previous chapter we presented eight categories of 
SAT (see section 2.2.5. Structured Analytic Techniques), each one containing several 
different techniques. However, there is a specific technique that is used for modeling 
complex social and organizational planning problems that are not easily quantifiable (often 
called “wicked problems” or “social messes”). Wicked problems are about issues that cannot 
be quantified, containing complex uncertainties and dependent of its stakeholders. For 
instance, threat assessment, social perceptions or technological development. 
Turns that, the General Morphological Analysis (GMA; developed by Fritz Zwicky10) brings 
us the solution to deal with such problems. This method has been applied by Zwicky on 
several fields, such as classification of astrophysical objects11  and development of new 
forms of propulsive power systems12. Later, GMA started to be used by several engineers, 
operational researchers, and by a large number of researchers in the field of policy analysis 
and future projections. Most recently, with the advances on computer support the creation 
of non-quantified inference models became promising, extending GMA functionalities and 
its range of application (Rhyne, 1981; Coyle, 1996; Ritchey, 2011).  
This method, GMA, analyzes and model complex social, organizational and political 
systems by decomposing the problem into a problem space, and then examines the total set 
of possible relationships between attributes in that problem space. The process for creating 
the problem space goes through a cycle of two principles: (i) analysis; and (ii) analysis-
synthesis (Zwicky, 1966; Heuer & Pherson, 2014). 
 
(i). GMA Analysis phase (decomposition) 
The analysis principle consists on identifying and defining the most important dimensions. 
Then each dimension should be decomposed into a spectrum of attributes that will represent 
the parameter space of the problem in need of investigation. Then, this information should 
be organized in the morphological field (also named Zwicky box) into a n-dimensional 
morphological field (see Table 3 – 4-dimension Morphological Field). 
                                               
10 Zwicky, F. (1948). The Morphological Method of Analysis and Construction. Courant. Anniversary 
Volume. New York: Intersciences Publish. pp. 461-470.  
11 Zwicky, F. (1948). Morphological Astronomy. The Observatory. Vol. 68, No. 845. pp. 121-143  
12 Zwicky, F. (1948). Morphology of aerial propulsion. Helvetica Physica Acta. Vol. XXI, Heft 5. pp. 299-
340. 
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Dimension A Dimension B Dimension C Dimension D 
Attribute A.1 Attribute B.1. Attribute C.1. Attribute D.1. 
Attribute A.2 Attribute B.2. Attribute C.2. Attribute D.2. 
Attribute A.3  Attribute C.3. Attribute D.3. 
   Attribute D.4. 
Table 3 – 4-dimension Morphological Field13 
The next step, is to calculate the total number of simple configurations (Tc) from our 
morphological field (N). Considering the number of parameters in the morphological field 
(N), and the number of attributes (Ax) in the value range of a dimension, the total number of 
simple configurations (Tc) in the morphological field is calculated by the following equation: 
!" =$%&'&()  
The result from the previous calculus demonstrates that the 4-dimension morphological field 
(N=4) from our example has Tc = 72 possible simple configurations14. The colored cells in 
this field shows one variable from each dimension and therefore one possible solution to the 
complex problem (Richey, T. 2011).  
However, we already know that our complex problem relies on finding a solution to fill the 
gap found on the PTES Threat Modeling phase. The research for this problem resulted in the 
iModeling Universe (Figure 14 – iPentest: iModeling Universe attributes) for which we 
know that has 16-dimension morphological field (N=16).  Applying the previous calculus, 
iModeling Universe has Tc	 = 3,7187345	possible configurations15.  
The main problem is that as the number of dimensions increases, the number of simple 
configurations increases as well, which makes difficult to analyze all these configurations 
by hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Note. The colored cells define one of all the possible combinations. Adapted from Ritchey, 2011. 
14 Calculated through: Tc = 3 × 2 × 3 × 4 = 72 
15 Calculated through: Tc = 	3 × 4 × 3 × 8 × 13 × 13 × 5 × 11 × 7 × 3 × 7 × 7 × 3 × 6 × 9 × 	5 =3,7187345	 
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(ii). GMA analysis-synthesis principle 
The analysis-synthesis principle consists in examining the relationships between these 
attributes, which will significantly reduce the field by identifying all mutually contradictory 
conditions. This principle will not be performed on this research but it’s explained how 
theoretically works.  
As mentioned, this principle requires that every attribute from the morphological field 
should be paired with another, excluding all non-possible relationships between attributes, 
which makes the total solution space smaller and more consistent.  
This principle uses a process named Cross-Consistency Assessment (CCA) which is used to 
check the integrity, clarity the concepts and to identify incompatible relationships between 
attributes. The Cross-Consistency matrix (CCM) works as an accounting table for the CCA 
process (see Figure 15 – Cross-Consistency Matrix for 4-dimension Morphological Field). 
CCM can be seen as a relational database and used as a high-level relational knowledge base 
(gathering typologies about the relation between attributes from the complex problem under 
investigation). 
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Figure  15 – Cross-Consistency Matrix for 4-dimension Morphological Field 
The CCA process involves two assessment phases: (1) to determine the total number of 
parameters blocks that are connected and which are not; (2) to identify and flag incompatible 
pairs of values. 
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Phase 1 – Total nº. Parameters Block (PB) 
The CCM cross-references the value range of each pair of parameters which is called 
parameter block (PB) and the number of PB in the CCM is calculated through the following 
expression (represents the total number of possible relationships between those dimensions): 
;< =	)='	(' − )) 
Taking in account the “Table 3 – 4-dimension Morphological Field”, this morphological 
field (N=4) contains PB= 45 4	(4 − 1) = 6. Applying the same calculus to iModeling 
Universe, the morphologic field (N=16) contains PB= 45 16	(16 − 1) = 120.   
Phase 2 – Total nº. Dyadic Relationships (Dt) 
It is necessary to identify the total number of invalid configurations. The total number of 
dyadic (pairwise) relationships (Dt) between all attributes in the cross-consistency matrix is 
calculated through the following expression: 
B B C& × CDED(&F)EG)&()  
The 4-dimension morphological field (N=4) contains 3,2,3,4 attributes, so Dt= 144. 
Applying the same calculus to iModeling Universe, the morphologic field (N=16) contains 
3,4,3,8,13,13,5,11,7,5,7,7,3,6,9,5 attributes, so Dt= 5354. 
 
In sum, morphological models have the following four formal properties (see Table 4 – Four 
Formal Properties of iModeling CCA):  
iModeling Properties 
Parameters in the Morphological Field (N)  N 
 
16 
Parameter Block (PB)  )='	(' − )) 
 
120 
Dyadic Relationships (Dt)  B B C& × CDED(&F)EG)&()  
 
5354 
Total nº of Simple Configurations (Tc)  Tc = V1  ×	V2 …VN 
 
3,7187345 
Table 4 – Four Formal Properties of iModeling CCA 
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Applying CCA technique to morphological fields makes possible to identify variables that 
have plausible, practicable and valid relationships, and to identify those which have no link 
at all. This connectivity can reduce by to 90% or even 99% the space solution, providing 
reliable conduits of information and consequently more accurate results (Heuer & Pherson, 
2014; Richey & Alvarez, 2015).   
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4. iPENTEST EVALUATION  
This chapter aims to evaluate the iPentest proposal, in particular our proposal for the Threat 
Modeling phase, the iModeling Universe attributes. This proposal, henceforth named 
iModeling is going to be evaluated through the creation and analysis of case studies as proof-
of-concept.  
The main objective of this chapter is to provide means to understand complex cyber security 
problems with greater clarity, elucidate about previously hidden issues, and to extrapolate 
key results to support foreseeing. 
To encompasses diverse perspectives of cyber security incidents, this chapter is divided into 
three case studies concerning each iModeling applicability: (1) Penetration testing mapping; 
(2) Cybercriminal investigation; (3) Cyber risk analysis. 
Each case study is divided into three sections, described as follows:  
(i). Description – in this section, the case study background and major findings 
(evidences) are briefly clarified. Also, the subject of analysis or object under 
investigation is described. 
(ii). Modeling – in this section, iModeling is used to outline possible scenarios using the 
existing evidences. The total number of scenarios and other formal properties of 
iModeling are also calculated. The links between the attribute were not assessed 
through the cross-consistency assessment. Instead, cyber security professionals 
provided them expertise to reduce the total solution space. These links were assessed 
considering four level of credibility: evidences, high and moderate and low confidence 
traces (see Figure 31 – Hypotheses Credibility; see Table 5 – Assumptions 
quantification). 
(iii). Analysis – in this section, iModeling Universe of attributes scenarios are explained 
and discussed. 
 
Hypotheses Credibility Quantification 
Evidence 100% certainty  
High confidence traces Between 90% to 100% 
Moderate confidence traces Between 50% to 90% 
Low confidence traces Less than 50% 
Table 5 – Assumptions quantification 
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4.1. Case Study 1 – Penetration testing mapping 
There are several advantages related to security audits, such as Penetration tests. The 
objective is to reveal weaknesses in computer science systems that could lead to data breach 
and other malicious intrusions. Once these vulnerabilities have been identified, the Pentester 
tries to exploit them to assess the technological capabilities that hackers need to proficiently 
compromise those systems, showing this way the real security business risk. Thereby, it 
makes possible to implement recommendations, controls and policies to improve the overall 
security, which is particularly important to ensure the continuity of business that has an 
online presence. 
 
4.1.1. Description 
Over the past decade, eCommerce brought essential changes to the way businesses are 
conducted. The continuous advances of technology and Internet results in many benefits for 
eCommerce sales. For instance, this new reality makes possible to create a startup at a low 
financial cost compared to all the costs related to physical shops. Moreover, online stores 
bring the opportunity to offer personalized customer experience, increasing revenues and 
customer loyalty. But when a business engages in eCommerce it faces many new risks, thus 
addressing those risks with appropriate security and control measures should be the 
businesses priority. The most common cybernetic risks of running an online shop are related 
to online security, system reliability, credit card fraud, privacy issues among other risks 
related to the business operationality. As proof-of-concept, the iModeling was applied to a 
Portuguese online shop website related to the sale of Gems, Crystals and handmade jewelry. 
In order to reach more consumers, this company, henceforth named G&C, recently changed 
its business model by expanding the business to an online store. Worried about the security 
issues G&C's CEOs have asked for a security audit of their website. The iModeling was 
applied on G&C website to test its current security status. 
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4.1.2. Modeling 
The modeling process takes as starting point the iModeling solution space, where we 
introduce the evidences we collected during this investigation (see Figure 16 – iModeling 
application: G&C’s website pentest). 
 
Figure  16 – iModeling application: G&C’s website pentest 
Applying iModeling on G&C’s website we have nine known evidences. The remaining 
dimensions from iModeling field (N=7) will be considered to generate all the possible 
scenarios (Tc = 1115400) (see Table 6 – iModeling CCA: G&C’s website pentest). 
Parameters in the Morphological Field (N) 7 
Parameter Block (PB) 21 
Dyadic Relationships Dt) 2828 
Total nº of Simple Configurations (Tc) 1115400 
Table 6 – iModeling CCA: G&C’s website pentest 
The total number of possible scenarios is still too high to be processed by hand. Therefore, 
the next step in this process would be the creation of cross consistency matrix which would 
examine all the internal relationships between the remaining seven dimensions considering 
three levels of confidence (high, moderate and low confidence). This process would largely 
reduce the possible total number of simple configurations and automate of iModeling output 
scenarios. So, when the Pentester introduces the seven known evidences, the iModeling 
automatically gives output scenarios with three levels of confidence. However, the analysis 
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of the internal relations between attributes found on the remaining dimensions were not 
included on this case study. The following illustration represents three possible scenarios for 
G&C’s penetration mapping (see Figure 17 – iModeling scenarios: G&C’s website pentest). 
 
Figure  17 – iModeling scenarios: G&C’s website pentest 
iModeling Dimensions
1.A. 1.B. 1.C. 1.D. 1.E. 2.F. 2.G. 2.H. 2.I. 2.J. 3.K 3.L. 3.M. 3.N. 3.O. 3.P.
LEGEND:
Scenario 1 Scenario 3 Evidence (100%)
Scenario 2 Standard Scenario High Confidence traces (>90% to <100%)
Moderate Confidence traces (50% to 90%)
Low Confidence traces (<50%)
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4.1.3. Analysis 
The analysis was carried out considering three different scenarios to support the explanation 
of G&C’s website penetration test results.  
 
Analysis of scenario 1  
(1) Agent profiling: in this scenario the source of attack is an authorized Pentester, with a 
high level of practical and theoretical knowledge to perform the security audit to G&C’s 
website. 
(2) Attack profiling: this scenario shows that G&C’s website is vulnerable to cross-site 
scripting (XSS). During the exploitation phase, the Pentester verifies that it could be 
possible to use tools to get zombie browsers via XSS (distributed tool). XSS is a type of 
computer security vulnerability that enables attackers to inject client-side scripts into web 
pages. The Pentester verifies there is no user’s input validation (filtration). Consequently, 
it will be possible to inject scripts to steal user information (cookies, root credentials, etc). 
 (3) Impact profiling: if an external source successfully exploits the described vulnerability 
it might affect customer’s data confidentiality. There is an elevated risk of compromising 
security through this method. 
 
Analysis of scenario 2  
(1) Agent profiling: as described in scenario 1.  
(2) Attack profiling: this scenario shows that G&C’s website is vulnerable to SQL 
injection. During the exploitation phase, the Pentester verifies that it could be possible to 
use autonomous SQL injection tools that both detects and exploits SQL injection flaws. 
This method is often used to extract data when the host website accepts user inputs, as 
verified with G&C’s website. 
(3) Impact profiling: if an external source successful exploit the described vulnerability it 
might affect customer’s data integrity. There is an elevated risk of compromising security 
through this method. 
 
Analysis of scenario 3  
(1) Agent profiling: as described in scenario 1.  
(2) Attack profiling: this scenario shows that G&C’s website is vulnerable to brute force 
attacks. During the exploitation phase, the Pentester verifies that it could be possible to set 
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up customized scripts that successively try different username and password combinations 
until a match is discovered (gain privileges) and resulting in an unauthorized access to 
G&C’s website (unauthorized authentication).  
(3) Impact profiling: as described in scenario 2. 
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4.2. Case Study 2 – Cybercriminal investigation 
We are living in a modern era based on technology where cybercriminals use Internet and 
computer technology to gain illicit advantages. We are facing a parallel form of living that 
grows up at a rampant volume and pace. Cybercrime is emerging as a serious threat in the 
society. It’s the revolution of conventional crimes where computer is used as tool, as the 
target of crime, or both. Cybercriminals can commit malicious acts with near impunity, 
mostly because there are several barriers on cybercrime investigation. This is one of the 
hardest tasks for law enforcement agencies, starting on the legal system that has been forged 
in the physical world for physical crimes over centuries, while the Internet has less than three 
decades old.  
Cybercriminals are often seen as faceless computer geeks hiding behind a computer, but 
there are individuals involved in cybercrime that aren’t necessarily sophisticated. 
Contextualizing threats, motivations and capability to perform malicious acts is the key to 
crack cybercrime. 
iModeling Universe of attributes proposal offers to cybercrime investigators the ability to 
contextualize cybercriminals and their threats based upon existing evidences. Modeling real-
world cybercrimes allows a satisfactory explanation of a case which may involve many other 
crimes and investigations. 
 
4.2.1. Description 
As proof-of-concept, the iModeling was applied on an Electrical Household Appliances 
Company, henceforth named as EHAC18. This company has recently received a massive 
email spam attack which led to the unavailability of email service. EHAC18 couldn’t use 
the email service for two business days. The email is a critical asset for this company as they 
receive several service markings for the domiciles of their customers and requests for 
business units. It is known that the email service and EHAC18 website is from an 
outsourcing server hosting. This company leads this business market and there aren’t known 
competitors with malicious intentions. The iModeling have been used to find plausible 
interpretations that explain how this security incident happened, aiding the criminal 
investigation on course.  
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4.2.2. Modeling 
The modeling process takes as starting point the iModeling solution space, where we 
introduce the evidences we collected during this investigation (see Figure 18 – iModeling 
application: EHAC18). 
 
Figure  18 – iModeling application: EHAC18 
Applying iModeling on EHAC18’s cybercriminal investigation we have nine known 
evidences. The remaining dimensions from iModeling field (N=7) will be considered to 
generate all the possible scenarios (Tc = 93600) (see Table 7 – iModeling CCA: EHAC18). 
Parameters in the Morphological Field (N) 7 
Parameter Block (PB) 21 
Dyadic Relationships Dt) 3009 
Total nº of Simple Configurations (Tc) 93600 
Table 7 – iModeling CCA: EHAC18 
The total number of possible scenarios is still too high to be processed by hand. 
Consequently, the next step in this process would be the creation of cross consistency matrix 
which would examine all the internal relationships between the remaining seven dimensions 
considering three levels of confidence (high, moderate and low confidence). This process 
would largely reduce the possible total number of simple configurations and automate of 
iModeling output scenarios. So, when the investigator responsible for this criminal process 
introduces the seven known evidences, the iModeling gives output scenarios with three 
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levels of confidence. However, the analysis of the internal relations between attributes found 
on the remaining dimensions were not part of this case study. The following illustration 
represents three possible scenarios for EHAC18’s cybercriminal investigation (see Figure 
19 – iModeling scenarios: EHAC18). 
 
Figure  19 – iModeling scenarios: EHAC18 
iModeling Dimensions
1.A. 1.B. 1.C. 1.D. 1.E. 2.F. 2.G. 2.H. 2.I. 2.J. 3.K 3.L. 3.M. 3.N. 3.O. 3.P.
LEGEND:
Scenario 1 Scenario 3 Evidence (100%)
Scenario 2 Standard Scenario High Confidence traces (>90% to <100%)
Moderate Confidence traces (50% to 90%)
Low Confidence traces (<50%)
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4.2.3. Analysis 
The analysis is carried out considering three different scenarios to find plausible 
explanations for EHAC18’s security incident and their implications.  
 
Analysis of scenario 1  
(1) Agent profiling: the source of the threat is described as an external malicious agent with 
the main motivation of making profit (economic motivations) and has a high level of 
practical and theoretical knowledge. 
(2) Attack profiling: the tool used to the execution of this attack is described as a spambot 
(distributed tool) which automatically gathers extensive lists of random email addresses 
and then uses legitimate SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) credentials to masquerade 
spam messages as legitimate emails. This spam attack is functional and successfully floods 
the mailbox and overwhelm the server on which the EHAC18’s mailbox is hosted (theft of 
resources).  
(3) Impact profiling: through the existing evidences the impact resulting from this security 
incident is described. EAHC18’ employees couldn’t access to email requests from its 
customers and partners (data availability) during two business days. This led to limited 
costs in the remediation of this as well as lost reputation and customer loyalty (moderate 
risk). 
 
Analysis of scenario 2 
(1) Agent profiling: the source of the threat is described as an external malicious agent with 
the main motivation of disrupting EAHC18’ services (politic motivations) and has a high 
level of practical and theoretical knowledge. 
(2) Attack profiling: the attacker used a malware toolkit to successfully infect the email 
server through a link or a file send for an email (file inclusion). This spam attack effectively 
theft email server resources. 
(3) Impact profiling: as described in scenario 1. 
 
Analysis of scenario 3 
(1) Agent profiling: the source of the threat is described as a business partner agent with 
the main motivation of taking control of EAHC18’ email service (political motivations). 
The agent has high level of practical but intermediate level of theoretical knowledge. 
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(2) Attack profiling: the attacker used a known email server vulnerability (customized 
program) to successfully gain privileges over EAHC18’ email server which led the email 
server to be compromised (increased access) by being sent spam.  
(3) Impact profiling: as described in scenario 1. 
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4.3. Case Study 3 – Cyber risk analysis 
Cyber threats are one of the most highly and impactfully source of cyber risk. Understanding 
and managing the cyber risk is a fundamental shift for organizations. Businesses are 
investing in technology to gain a competitive advantage in their given markets but not to 
protect their information systems. Business managers should understand the root cause and 
magnitude of cyber risks and consider its impact on their organizations. Cyber risk is usually 
defined as exposure to harm or financial losses resulting from vulnerabilities and attacks to 
information systems.  
There are many benefits of making cyber risk assessments beyond simply complying with 
government regulations. It has become clear that today’s organizations can no longer wait 
when it comes to cyber security. A comprehensive review of administrative, technical, and 
physical security are now necessary safeguards and protocols to protect organizations, their 
employees, customers and business partners. However, a strategic shift is required to be 
prepared to deal with serious cyber issues and vulnerabilities and then make more informed 
decisions. For instance, strengthen security requirements any time personal or sensitive 
information needs to be exchanged or shared within the organization and their partners. 
Organizations should use these cyber security risk assessments to create their competitive 
advantage.  
iModeling proposal offers organizations the ability to characterize business assets and 
process threats, and their impact on the organization. iModeling uses the existing evidences 
to evaluate the impact.  
4.3.1. Description 
As proof-of-concept, iModeling was applied to the Alcácer do Sal City Hall, the municipal 
council of this City Hall, henceforth named as AS City Hall.  
The AS City Hall is responsible for protecting their information systems and the personal 
data of its employees and citizens they have to handle every day. Concerned about the 
cybersecurity risk, they invest in the adoption of information systems security policies, 
promoting regularly awareness of privacy and data protection issues among its employees 
and partners. We asked to the AS City Hal’s IT department for their collaboration to apply 
iModeling. As they often perform penetration tests to identify potential vulnerabilities and 
continuously improve the security of their technological infrastructures we could apply our 
model as a risk analysis framework to any asset threats on their infrastructure. So, during a 
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penetration test they found a vulnerability on their website concerning brute force attack. 
This vulnerability was successful exploited using scripts that uses different word dictionaries 
until find the password to login on their systems. Through consecutive attempts, they were 
able to successful access the administrator password and once inside the systems with root 
access a potential external threat could do everything with the information available (citizens 
and employees’ information, and data on local lodgings and restaurants). 
4.3.2. Modeling 
The modeling process takes as starting point the iModeling Universe attributes, where we 
introduce the evidences that were collected during the cyber risk assessment (see Figure 20 
– iModeling application: AS City Hall). 
 
Figure  20 – iModeling application: AS City Hall 
Applying iModeling on the AS City Hall’s cyber risk assessment we have twelve known 
evidences. The remaining dimensions from iModeling field (N=4) will be considered to 
generate all the possible scenarios (Tc = 945) (see Table 8 – iModeling CCA: AS City Hall). 
Parameters in the Morphological Field (N) 4 
Parameter Block (PB) 6 
Dyadic Relationships Dt) 266 
Total nº of Simple Configurations (Tc) 945 
Table 8 – iModeling CCA: AS City Hall 
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The total number of possible scenarios is still too high to be processed by hand. 
Consequently, the next step in this process would be the creation of cross consistency matrix 
which would examine all the internal relationships between the remaining four dimensions 
considering three levels of confidence (high, moderate and low confidence). This process 
would largely reduce the possible total number of simple configurations and automate of 
iModeling Universe of attributes output scenarios. So, when the cyber risk auditor or the 
Pentester introduces the twelve known evidences, the iModeling automatically gives output 
scenarios with three levels of confidence. However, the analysis of the internal relations 
between attributes found on the remaining dimensions were not part of this case study. The 
following illustration represents three possible scenarios for the AS City Hall cyber risk 
analysis (see Figure 21 – iModeling scenarios: AS City Hall). 
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Figure  21 – iModeling scenarios: AS City Hall 
 
 
iModeling Dimensions
1.A. 1.B. 1.C. 1.D. 1.E. 2.F. 2.G. 2.H. 2.I. 2.J. 3.K 3.L. 3.M. 3.N. 3.O. 3.P.
LEGEND:
Scenario 1 Scenario 3 Evidence (100%)
Scenario 2 Standard Scenario High Confidence traces (>90% to <100%)
Moderate Confidence traces (50% to 90%)
Low Confidence traces (<50%)
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4.3.3. Analysis 
The analysis is carried out considering three different scenarios to find plausible 
explanations for the AS City Hall cyber risk assessment. For this case study, we have all 
details about the Agent and Attack profiling. Therefore, this analysis covers only the impact 
profiling. 
 
Analysis of scenario 1  
(1) Agent Profiling: the AS City Hall confirmed that the agent could be any external source 
with a high practical knowledge training and low to moderate theoretical knowledge and 
with desire to execute malicious actions for fun and curiosity.  
(2) Attack Profiling: during its Pentesting, the AS City Hall confirmed that a vulnerability 
on their website concerning the brute force attack. Through this vulnerability they could 
use a script to gain a privileged access and authenticate into their systems.  
(3) Impact profiling: the result of the technical security assessment of the AS City Hall 
reveal that a successful brute-force could affect the confidentiality of the data of its citizens. 
Even though passwords policy is not specifically mentioned on the Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR), it requires a high level of 
protection for personal data. It has been verified that the AS City Hall has a high risk of 
security compromising and at the same time, in compliance with the GDPR, it has a high 
risk of being fined, confirmed through the Pentest results. 
 
Analysis of scenario 2 
(1) and (2) as described in scenario 1. 
(3) Impact profiling: the result of the technical security assessment of the AS City Hall 
reveal that a successful brute-force could affect the confidentiality of the sensitive data of 
its employees. As result it may lead to the loss of confidence of the employees. It has been 
verified that the AS City Hall has a high risk of security compromising by external agents. 
 
Analysis of scenario 3 
(1) and (2) as described in scenario 1. 
(3) Impact profiling: the result of the technical security assessment of the AS City Hall 
reveal that a successful brute-force could affect the integrity of data and information 
regarding accommodation and restaurants in the municipality of Alcácer do Sal. These data 
  iPentest 
 
 70 
could be destroyed or altered thereby producing false information. It has been verified that 
the AS City Hall has a high risk of security compromising by external agents. 
iPentest 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
While reviewing the PTES recommendation we found relevant to create a proposal model 
for the PTES Threat Modeling phase. Moreover, we realized that it could be possible to 
merge different fields of expertise such as Penetration tests and Intelligence. To our 
knowledge, we merged for the first time such different fields, which is an important finding 
by adding new knowledge to the field and increases the motivation to look for the correlation 
between different knowledge domains and create common features of application. 
After examining the existing Intelligence techniques, we showed that is possible to apply 
those techniques (SAT) to the construction of a threat modeling approach, maintaining its 
consistency in terms of threat agents, their capabilities and knowledge representation 
according to business assets and the ability to replicate this model in future tests with the 
same results. 
We found that GMA is a SAT that focuses mostly on modeling not quantified complex 
issues, such as threat modeling. Therefore, we applied GMA in our threat modeling 
approach, named iModeling Universe attributes, to automatically generate predictive 
scenarios. 
The iModeling Universe of attributes proposal focuses on the clear identification of critical 
characteristics within cyber security incidents, such as agent profiling, attack profiling and 
impact profiling. The iModeling Universe of attributes can be applied to a wide range of 
Internet connected devices and to a wider range of organizations within the modern society. 
In this research we present three distinct application scenarios of iModeling Universe of 
attributes proposal: (1) Penetration testing mapping; (2) Cybercriminal investigation; (3) 
Cyber risk analysis. 
§ The Penetration testing mapping offers Pentesters the possibility to understand the 
Pentest from two different perspectives: defensive and offensive. The defensive 
perspective focuses on the attackers and attempts to understand attacks, identifying 
vulnerabilities and developing a defensive strategy. The objective is to identify attack 
approaches and minimize the risk of attack success. The offensive perspective focuses 
on the defenders and attempts to understand defenses, identifying weaknesses and 
developing an offensive strategy. The objective is to exploit defenses and minimize the 
risk of attack failure. 
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§ The Cybercriminal investigation applicability offers the possibility to collect evidences 
found on the cybercrime scene and input it on iModeling Universe of attributes. It results 
in the combination of possible strategies of Cybercriminal investigation. Modeling 
cybercrimes allows to understand how cybercrimes are committed (root causes) and to 
reflect about adequate approaches to investigate cybercrime scenes. 
§ The Cyber risk analysis offers a full-scale view of organization’s cyber risks over time 
and may serve as a roadmap for business resilience by improving their cybersecurity 
measures. With the iModeling Universe of attributes it is possible to identify the risks 
that a successful cyber-attack have on the organization’s critical assets and processes. 
By understanding their cyber risk exposure, organizations can reduce their financial 
losses and increase their cybersecurity measures. The use of iModeling Universe of 
attributes for cyber risk assessment allows organizations to determine security policies, 
analyze plausible cyber scenarios and evaluate their impact within the organization. With 
the iModeling Universe of attributes output, organizations can make more informed 
business decisions such as evaluating security measures cost-benefit, regulatory 
compliance, managing the cyber risk, among others. 
In addition, as proof-of-concept we applied the iModeling Universe of attributes on these 
three different contexts of application which provided a potential mechanism for its 
validation. 
Importantly, the results of this research also allowed the creation of iPentest methodology, 
in which it is integrated the iModeling Universe of attributes, which is a potential 
methodology for improving PTES. The iPentest proposal is a new approach to execute the 
first phase of Penetration Tests that offers a better understanding of customer’s needs and 
the possibility to direct the Pentest towards specific scenarios. Ideally, these findings should 
be replicated in further studies for its validation. 
Overall, our results demonstrate a broad implication of Intelligence techniques in the 
Penetration tests. 
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Before answering the research questions, it is important to highlight the main contributions 
of this research: 
(i). Proposal for Intelligence Collection Source (see Figure 6 – Intelligence Collection 
Source); 
(ii). Proposal for iPentest methodology (see Figure 10 – iPentest Methodology); 
(iii). Proposal for the PTES Pre-engagement Interaction phase (see Figure 11 – iPentest: 
Planning & iScenario); 
(iv). Proposal approach for the PTES Threat Modeling Phase (see Figure 14 – iPentest: 
iModeling Universe of attributes). 
 
5.1.Answers to the research questions 
The central question from this dissertation focused on the creation of a threat modeling 
model basing on Intelligence techniques: “Could the Intelligence process be systematized, 
identifying methodologies, techniques, and tools to build a model for the PTES 
recommendation Threat’s Modeling phase?”. Our conclusion on this subject is that, 
indeed, it was possible to create a threat modeling approach for the PTES Threat’s Modeling 
phase based on the integration of Intelligence techniques. To reach this conclusion we began 
this dissertation with the support of the following three sub questions (SQ), which were 
transversal to the central question: 
 
Sub Question 1 – “Could it be possible to identify common features of application 
between Intelligence process and other domains?”  
Intelligence is currently related to the process of transforming data into information, and 
information into knowledge. Intelligence is the key for operational and strategic decision 
making. Therefore, Intelligence can be applied to any domain that needs data and 
information analysis, such as Businesses, Medical Diagnosis, Criminal Investigation, 
Computer Sciences Security, among others. Therefore, it was possible to identify common 
features of application between Intelligence and Penetration Tests. For instance, it was 
possible to correlate the Pre-engagement Interactions and Threat Modeling phases of PTES 
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with the Intelligence cycle, resulting in the iPentest methodology (Figure 10 – iPentest 
methodology), which is our proposal for PTES improvement.   
 
Sub Question 2 – “Could it be possible to identify methodologies, techniques, and tools 
that better adapt to specific Intelligence needs?” 
Intelligence products are categorized into different categories (see Figure 3 – Intelligence 
Products) and are distinguished by the purpose for which Intelligence was produced. We 
identified several robust analytic techniques (see Figure 8 – Structured Analytic Techniques) 
used for information and Intelligence analysis. These techniques are directed toward 
different purposes (see Figure 9 – Selecting the right technique). Regarding this finding, we 
proposed a methodology that offers Pentesters an approach to optimize the first interactions 
within a customer (see Planning & iScenario from “Figure 10 – iPentest Methodology”). 
The iPentest Planning & iScenario phase uses the concepts of the Planning & Directing 
phase from Intelligence cycle, offering Pentesters an approach for a better understanding of 
customer’s needs. Regarding the existing techniques and their specific application to 
Intelligence needs, it was also possible to create an approach that offers Pentesting’ 
customers the possibility to select specific scenarios. Those scenarios were constructed 
based on the techniques that better adapt to specific Intelligence needs (see Figure 12 – 
iPentest: Planning & iScenario SAT).  
 
Sub Question 3 – “Could it be possible to apply Intelligence methodologies and 
techniques to build a Threat Modeling model?” 
It was possible to create a threat modeling approach using the GMA as the engine behind 
iModeling Universe of attributes (see Figure 14 – iPentest: iModeling Universe of 
attributes). GMA is a dynamic modeling method which can be used to identify and 
investigate the total set of possible relations contained in a given problem complex. 
Therefore, GMA can be applied on the creation of threat modeling models. Although, the 
application of GMA in iModeling Universe of attributes is a proof-of-concept, which permits 
to automatically profile the attack, allowing to better understand its impact on business assets 
and processes and to uncover the attack agent characteristics.    
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5.2.Research Limitations 
During this research we had difficulties on finding scientific publications regarding PTES 
and Intelligence. Most of the bibliographic references about Intelligence are books of ex-
officials of the secret services or military documents publicly available. We found just a few 
scientific articles regarding PTES and much less regarding Intelligence. Consequently, we 
did not find references merging both fields. This resulted in an increased time spent on 
searching to obtain reliable sources of information. 
Another limitation that stood out during this research was the lack of Portuguese specialists 
on the Intelligence field. We had some contributions from companies and professors on the 
Pentesting field but on the Intelligence field we just found experts in OSINT information 
gathering.  However, to minimize the lack of national experts we collected information about 
Intelligence and threat modeling from several international and reliable sources, such as 
official secret agencies’ online libraries and Intelligence analysts’ forums. 
We believe that, even with the limitations of information and specialists, it was possible to 
compile in this dissertation a basis for the correlation between the concepts of Penetration 
Test and Intelligence, which we hope that will serve as a motivation for future research 
projects. 
 
5.3.Recommendations and Future Research 
Analyzing all the issues addressed in this research, we consider relevant to mention some 
recommendations and future research: 
§ The iPentest methodology proposes an improvement of the Pre-engagement Interaction 
phase and Threat Modeling phase from PTES, which we named in iPentest methodology 
as Planning and Threat Modeling phase.  
§ The iPentest Planning phase offers to Pentesters a structured thinking toolkit which 
increases the Pentesting planning efficiency and the possibility to execute the Pentesting 
directing it to specific scenarios (iScenario). However, this research needed to be 
delimitated to certain goals and it was not possible to validate the proposal. Therefore, 
future researches should be conducted in more realistic settings in order to consider the 
potential effects of the iPentest Planning & iScenario proposal on Penetration Tests. 
§ The iPentest Threat Modeling phase offers a threat modeling approach named iModeling 
Universe attributes. This approach defines a framework that allows to identify 
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organization’s assets; identify which systems comprise those assets and how they may 
compromise them; identify potential threat agents; and identify the impact if those assets 
are compromised. However, we believe that future research should look for possible 
improvements to the attributes that composes iModeling Universe of attributes. 
§ Additionally, future research should consider the potential effects of using the GMA to 
make the iModeling Universe of attributes generate threat modeling scenarios 
automatically. Future studies could fruitfully explore this issue by examining the internal 
relation between the attributes from iModeling Universe of attributes. This is the key 
component in future research to overcome the uncertainty of the results. 
§ Future research should continue to explore iModeling universe of attributes aiming to 
develop a computer software for predictive threat modeling scenarios with a high degree 
of accuracy. 
§ The human interaction with technology is a complex problem and this complexity 
increases every day. Consequently, we believe the threat modeling will become a 
foundation for implementing detailed technical, organizational or legal mitigations and 
for increasing the reliability of our decisions. We believe that cyber threat modeling 
should be considered in future research to evaluate its potential socioeconomic effects in 
modern society. 
§ We conclude that our iPentest methodology proposal fits today's incident security issues. 
However, with the uncontrollable speed of technology, soon iModeling universe of 
attributes must be adapted to new types of threats and be prepared to protect different 
critical assets and operating in socio-technical systems. There are plenty of new 
vulnerabilities appearing every day, so there will always be question marks and loose 
ends on the security of Internet-connected devices. 
§ Additionally, with the extensibility of computers it is possible to program everything 
around us to become a computer which can do almost everything. However, there are 
large concerns related to extensible systems: first, those systems are hard to secure 
because programmers can’t anticipate every flaw; second, they depend on the digital 
world so they can’t be externally limited; third, the extensibility means that every system 
can be upgraded with new features, and those upgrades may contain new vulnerabilities. 
We are facing a complex problem where it is urgent to be prepared to deal with all kinds 
of threats, such as the Internet + threats. The impact of these threats can become 
catastrophic and we must set a strategy to minimize negative consequences (Schneier, 
2018). 
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§ Founding on iModeling Universe of attributes, future research should be devoted to the 
development of Internet + threat modeling. This does not mean that our research is 
incomplete or outdated, rather we prefer to say that it is difficult to create a solution that 
keeps pace with technological advances. We deeply believe that the information 
compilated on this research may serve as motivation for further and divergent researches. 
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Annex I – PTES: Pre-Engagement Interactions 
 
PTES Pre-Engagement Interactions Phase is divided into seven sections: 1) Scoping, 2) 
Goals, 3) Testing Terms & Definitions, 4) Questionnaires, 5) Establish lines of 
Communication, 6) Rules of Engagement, and 7) Capabilities and Technology in place, as 
represented in “Figure 22 – Pre-Engagement Interactions Phase mind map”. 
 
 
 Figure  22 – Pre-Engagement Interactions Phase mind map16  
 
 
 
  
                                               
16 Note. Nickerson et al., n.d. 
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Annex Ia – Pre-Engagement Interactions: Questionnaires 
 
A PTES begins with an initial communication with the client through a set of questions that 
have to be answered in order to accomplish the first phase. These questions are directed for 
specific targets: Business Unit Managers, System Administrators, and depends on the object 
under analysis. The following are sample questions which should be asked to extract relevant 
information. However, it is suggested to complement those sample questions with additional 
questions (Nickerson et al., n.d.): 
 
1. QUESTIONS FOR BUSINESS UNIT MANAGERS 
1.1. Is the manager aware that a test is about to be performed?  
1.2. What is the main datum that would create the greatest risk to the organization if exposed, 
corrupted, or deleted?  
1.3. Are testing and validation procedures to verify that business applications are functioning 
properly in place?  
1.4. Will the testers have access to the Quality Assurance testing procedures from when the 
application was first developed?  
1.5. Are Disaster Recovery Procedures in place for the application data? 
2. QUESTIONS FOR SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATORS 
2.1. Are there any systems which could be characterized as fragile? (systems with tendencies to 
crash, older operating systems, or which are unpatched)  
2.2. Are there systems on the network which the client does not own, that may require additional 
approval to test?  
2.3. Are Change Management procedures in place?  
2.4. What is the mean time to repair systems outages?  
2.5. Is any system monitoring software in place?  
2.6. What are the most critical servers and applications?  
2.7. Are backups tested on a regular basis?  
2.8. When was the last time the backups were restored? 
3. NETWORK PENETRATION TEST 
3.1. Why is the customer having the penetration test performed against their environment?  
3.2. Is the penetration test required for a specific compliance requirement?  
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3.3. When does the customer want the active portions (scanning, enumeration, exploitation, 
etc...) of the penetration test conducted?  
3.3.1. During business hours?  
3.3.2. After business hours?  
3.3.3. On the weekends?  
3.4. How many total IP addresses are being tested?  
3.4.1. How many internal IP addresses, if applicable?  
3.4.2. How many external IP addresses, if applicable?  
3.5. Are there any devices in place that may impact the results of a penetration test such as a 
firewall, intrusion detection/prevention system, web application firewall, or load balancer?  
3.6. In the case that a system is penetrated, how should the testing team proceed?  
3.7. Perform a local vulnerability assessment on the compromised machine?  
3.7.1. Attempt to gain the highest privileges (root on Unix machines, SYSTEM or 
Administrator on Windows machines) on the compromised machine? 
3.7.2. Perform no, minimal, dictionary, or exhaustive password attacks against local 
password hashes obtained (for example, /etc/shadow on Unix machines)?  
4. WEB APPLICATION PENETRATION TEST 
4.1. How many web applications are being assessed?  
4.2. How many login systems are being assessed?  
4.3. How many static pages are being assessed? (approximate)  
4.4. How many dynamic pages are being assessed? (approximate)  
4.5. Will the source code be made readily available?  
4.6. Will there be any kind of documentation?  
4.6.1. If yes, what kind of documentation?  
4.7. Will static analysis be performed on this application?  
4.8. Does the client want fuzzing performed against this application?  
4.9. Does the client want role-based testing performed against this application? 
4.10. Does the client want credentialed scans of web applications performed? 
5. WIRELESS NETWORK PENETRATION TEST 
5.1. How many wireless networks are in place?  
5.2. Is a guest wireless network used? If so:  
5.2.1. Does the guest network require authentication? 
5.2.2. What type of encryption is used on the wireless networks? 
5.2.3. What is the square footage of coverage? 
5.2.4. Will enumeration of rogue devices be necessary? 
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5.2.5. Will the team be assessing wireless attacks against clients? 
5.2.6. Approximately how many clients will be using the wireless network 
6. PHYSICAL PENETRATION TEST 
6.1. How many locations are being assessed? 
6.2. Is this physical location a shared facility? If so: 
6.2.1. How many floors are in scope? 
6.2.2. Which floors are in scope?  
6.3. Are there any security guards that will need to be bypassed? If so: 
6.3.1. Are the security guards employed through a 3rd party? 
6.3.2. Are they armed? 
6.3.3. Are they allowed to use force?  
6.4. How many entrances are there into the building? 
6.5. Is the use of lock picks or bump keys allowed? (also consider local laws) 
6.6. Is the purpose of this test to verify compliance with existing policies and procedures or for 
performing an audit? 
6.7. What is the square footage of the area in scope? 
6.8. Are all physical security measures documented? 
6.9. Are video cameras being used? 
6.9.1. Are the cameras client-owned? If so: 
6.9.1.1. Should the team attempt to gain access to where the video camera data is 
stored?  
6.10. Is there an armed alarm system being used? If so: 
6.10.1. Is the alarm a silent alarm? 
6.10.2. Is the alarm triggered by motion? 
6.10.3. Is the alarm triggered by opening of doors and windows? 
7. SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
7.1. Does the client have a list of email addresses they would like a Social Engineering attack to 
be performed against? 
7.2. Does the client have a list of phone numbers they would like a Social Engineering attack to 
be performed against? 
7.3. Is Social Engineering for the purpose of gaining unauthorized physical access approved? If 
so:  
7.3.1. How many people will be targeted? 
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Annex II – PTES: Intelligence Gathering 
 
PTES Intelligence Gathering phase is divided into five sections: 1) Target selection, 2) 
OSINT, 3) Covert Gathering, 4) Foot printing, and 5) Identify Protection Mechanism, as 
represented in “Figure 23 – Intelligence Gathering Phase mind map”. 
 
Figure  23 – Intelligence Gathering Phase mind map17 
                                               
17 Note. Nickerson et al., n.d. 
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Annex III – PTES: Threat Modeling 
 
PTES Threat Modeling phase is divided into six sections: 1) Business Assets Analysis, 2) 
Business Processes Analysis, 3) Threat Agent/Community Analysis, 4) Threat Capability 
Analysis, 5) Motivation Modeling, and 6) Finding relevant news of comparable 
organizations, as represented in “Figure 24 – Threat Modeling Phase mind map”.  
 
Figure  24 – Threat Modeling Phase mind map18 
  
                                               
18 Note. Nickerson et al., n.d. 
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Annex IV - Threat Modeling: Threat Agents/Community Analysis 
 
A clear profiling of the threat agent should be classified in terms of Internal or External 
threat to the organization. It is also important to understand capabilities and motivations of 
each agent or community. Some examples of threat agents can be classified as represented 
in “Table 9 – Threat Agents/Community”. 
INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
Employees  Business Partners  
Management  
(executive, middle)  
Competitors  
Administrators  
(network, system, server)  
Contractors  
Developers  Suppliers  
Engineers  Nation States  
Technicians  Organized Crime  
Contractors  
(with their external users)  
Hacktivists  
General user community  Script Kiddies  
(recreational/random hacking)  
Remote Support   
Table 9 – Threat Agents/Community 19 
The employees can be understood as internal threats. These are the persons who work 
directly with the targeted company, including those working full-time and/or part-time.  In 
addition to employees, also the cleaning staff and security staff of the physical infrastructure 
work directly with technological infrastructure devices. Information can be collected from 
different sources using labored techniques, provided that imagination and creativity allow it. 
Depending on the position and roles, employees (e.g., chief department, executive) can have 
more or less access to privileged information. These persons can be influenced by attackers 
to participate or provide information that facilitates computer systems intrusions or even to 
act on their own, leading to illegal acts. At last, technological infrastructure information can 
be compromised due to the employees’ negligence or as a result of misinformation. 
  
                                               
19 Note. Adapted from Nickerson et al., n.d. 
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Annex V – Counter-Terrorism Analytical Framework 
 
The CTAF represents an example of structuring key topics for the subsequent collection and 
analysis of information regarding Terrorism contexts (CJCSI 3370.01, 2016). 
 
 
Figure  25 – CTAF20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
20 Note. CJCSI 3370.01, 2016 
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Annex VI - Information Classification 
 
Different types of information are distinguished in private information and publicly available 
information (Figure 26 – Information Classification). Private information refers to data and 
information of a particular individual, group or organization, that is protected from public 
disclosure, usually classified as Confidential Source. Public information refers to data and 
information published for public knowledge, which can be legally seen or heard by any 
casual observer. Sources of information that are not protected from public disclosure are 
generally classified as Open Source (OSINT IMF 2-22.9, 2006). Data and information 
resulting from sensitive sources or classified methods, are also classified as shown in Figure 
26 – Information Classification. except if Intelligence reveals the identity of the source or 
method (AR 380-5, 1988). 
 
 
 
Figure  26 – Information Classification21 
  
                                               
21 Note. Adapted from OSINT FMI 2-22.9, 2006 
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Annex VII – Evaluation Matrix 
 
Data and information must be subject to an evaluation, ensuring its consistency, usefulness 
and interpretation through the reliability of sources and credibility of the information through 
evaluations matrices. The “Figure 27 – Information Metric” is seen as a qualitative metric 
to evaluate the confidence level of sources and likelihood of information. 
 
Figure  27 – Information Metric22 
Further, the information is classified through evaluation matrices, which can be 4x4, 5x5, 
6x6, depending on the context in which they are inserted. The “Figure 28 – Evaluation 
Matrix” shows an example of a 4x4 matrix: 
 
Figure  28 – Evaluation Matrix23 
According to this matrix, we find that A1 information is consistent, because it is confirmed 
by other sources and its source of information is reliable. Therefore, A1 information is more 
credible than the others. As we go through the remaining columns and rows, the information 
has less consistency and confidence, not being so reliable. This assessment should be 
dynamic, since changes in the context or in searching for new information may alter previous 
evaluations (Fiães, 2014). 
                                               
22 Note. Adapted from Europol, 2010; JP 2.0, 2013. 
23 Note. Adapted from Europol, 2010; JP 2.0, 2013. 
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Annex VIII– Qualitative Language 
 
Typically, hypotheses result from incomplete data or information. It is not possible to 
confirm the possibility of occurrence of a certain event, which is equal to 1 or 0. But it is 
possible to determine if an event occurs or if an event does not occur. So, two events are 
mutually exclusive, that is, the occurrence of one of them excludes the occurrence of the 
other. Consequently, the probability of one event to occur is equal to the sum of the two 
probabilities (Box & Tiao, 1992)24. Therefore, in this context the probability of occurrence 
of a certain event, the links between events, or the degree of confidence of hypotheses, is 
measured through a qualitative language, as represented in “Figure 29 – Estimative 
Language” (CIA, 2008). 
 
 
Figure  29 – Estimative Language25 
While the labels Almost Certainly, Very Likely, and Likely are used as indicators of great 
probability of occurrence, the labels Unlikely, Very Unlikely, and Remote are used for less 
probable occurrences. We can also attribute to these terms the mathematical estimate of 
probabilities, as represented in “Figure 30 – Estimative Probability” (Platt, 1957; CIA, 
2008). 
 
Figure  30 – Estimative Probability26 
                                               
24 These rules are based on the principles of Bayesian Inferences applied to statistical analysis, which allows 
the deduction of uncertain events (Box & Tiao, 1992). 
25 Note. Adapted from National Intelligence Estimative (2007). 
26 Note. Adapted from Platt, 1957; CIA 2008. 
  iPentest 
 
 92 
Regarding the degree of confidence of formulated hypothesis, evaluations and estimates are 
supported by information which quality of information and sources varies according to their 
scope. The degree of confidence can be characterized in three distinct levels of confidence: 
High, Moderate, and Low (Figure 31 – Hypotheses Credibility). 
 
Figure  31 – Hyphoteses Credibility27 
  
                                               
27 Note. Adapted Europol, 2010; JP 2.0, 2013. 
  iPentest 
 
 93 
Annex IX– Social Engineering Attacks 
 
SE is the ability of leading human targets to compromise corporate information systems. It 
assumes two perspectives: directed to Humans or Software. SE attacks include physical, 
social and technical approaches used in different phases of the attack, as represented in 
“Figure 32 – SE Attacks” (Granger 2001; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Mitnick & Simon, 
2003; Mouton, et al, 2014; Krombholz, et al, 2015). 
 
 
Figure  32 – SE Attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
